エナクティビズムの検討 : 知覚における実存概念の再評価

Abstract

The theory of enactivism has received much attention in cognitive science. This theory argues that perception does not consist of the receiving of information about the existing world but rather the active investigation of the world by means of the body. Enactivism is made up of several branches. This paper will examine A. Noë's Action in Perception, a main work presenting one of these branches, and attempt to demonstrate why one of his inclinations is incorrect. We have the illusion that perception consists of making detailed representations of the world in the brain. Noë explains the source of this illusion by making a comparison to information gained from the World Wide Web. The immediate accessibility to this information sometimes makes us feel as if we possessed it in our computer. Noë clarifies that in a similar manner, the immediate accessibility to details about the world makes us feel as if we possessed such detailed representations in our brains. He also applies this explanation to reason why we, in a sense, "perceive" the backside of an object. However, he regards the backside as another front, and misses the properties of the backside. I think his mistake comes from his dismissing an individual's existential relationship to the world that constructs those properties. The abovementioned illusion is, I believe, also caused by a person's existential relation to backgrounds, to which backsides belong. Extending the enactivist view in his particular way, Noë disapproves of the clear distinction between perception and thinking. However, his perspective would permit no essential difference between perception and judgment based on the mechanically collected information about an object. However, when I judge in this way, I do not feel myself perceiving the object. On the other hand, I feel as if I perceived an object itself when I touch it with a stick in my hand. In this paper I clarify some important attributes of perception, comparing such a judgment with touching an object with a stick. One attribute is that in perception an object presents itself directly. The attribute is not factual but rather ontological because it is derived from the manner of being of the subject and of the world. Noë, however, fails to understand this. His misunderstanding about this and the other attributes results from his view that insists on the continuity between perception and thinking and his disregard for the concept of "existence." Through the argument outlined above, I revaluate the present-day efficacy of "existence" in perception.