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タイトル: 対象と論理 : マイノングとラッセル
その他のタイトル: Object and logic : Meinong and Russell
著者: 西村, 敦  KAKEN_name
著者名の別形: Nishimura, Atsushi
発行日: 1-Jul-2014
出版者: 京都大学大学院人間・環境学研究科『人間存在論』刊行会
誌名: 人間存在論
巻: 20
開始ページ: 45
終了ページ: 56
抄録: In this article, I clarify some of Russell's important philosophical features by comparing the thoughts of Russell and Meinong. Usually they are discussed in terms of their metaphysical consistency due to Russell's argument 'Meinongian objects are inconsistent.' in 'On Denoting'. Instead, in this article I pay attention to Russell's philosophical attitudes, which will emerge through the comparison of them. First what we have to notice is that, in addition to famous metaphysical similarities, both the early Russell and Meinong have an important point in common. It is well known that they each created a different kind of scholarship, namely logic and object theory, and argued for their necessity. In the background, however, they both have a common complaint on the absence of a meta viewpoint for looking over existing scholarship and a common understanding of the necessity of a framework endowing this viewpoint. Despite their agreement, he criticizes Meinong's theory of objects. First he criticizes Meinong's classification of objects, claiming that psychological viewpoint is mixed with his method of classification. According to Russell, the order of how we recognize an object is irrelevant in classification and that the order should be determined from a logical viewpoint. He also criticizes Meinong's thought of complexes such as definite descriptions and propositions. His criticism takes place in dealing with the problem of how we should understand the relationship of a complex to its components, taking account of the fact that a complex is more than a mere collection of them. Meinong asserts that first of all the existence of a complex is presupposed and the combination of the elements included in it is assured by privileged relation 'r', which is necessarily in complex. By contrast, Russell thinks, there is a gap between a complex and its collection of components, and that a complex should not be presupposed but should logically be constructed in some way. His solution is that a complex is constructed by the elements included in it and the fact 'the elements are related to each other'. This article reveals Russell's philosophical attitude, that is, a logical viewpoint is important in object theory, as well as his criticism of Meinong. His radical attitude that logical viewpoint can be used in dealing with philosophical problems seems to be the key understanding Russell's philosophy.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2433/198996
出現コレクション:第20号

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