知覚は矛盾を許容するか?

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to defend the conceptualism of perceptual experience by responding to one of the classical arguments for nonconceptualism, that is, the argument from the admissibility of contradiction. According to Crane, the waterfall illusion shows that perception admits of contradiction, unlike belief, and thus provides strong evidence for the claim that the content of perceptual experience is nonconceptual. How can conceptualists respond to this argument? First, I will introduce two possible counterarguments (one dissociating normal experience from illusory experience, the other challenging Crane’s phenomenology) and show that neither is convincing. I will then explain the framework of Matthen’s sensory classification theory and try to respond to Crane’s argument using this framework. The paper concludes that the waterfall illusion does not contain contradictory content and thus that Crane’s argument is untenable.