何が知覚されうるのか-知覚経験の許容内容について

Abstract

This paper provides a survey on the dispute about the admissible contents of perceptual experience. The question is whether we can perceive any “high-level properties” (such as causal property, disposition, kind property, mental state of others, moral property, absence, etc.). Low-level theorists claim that only “low-level properties” (such as color, shape, motion properties, sounds, etc.) are perceivable, whereas high-level theorists claim that some high-level properties are too. In Sect. 1, I explain the problem. In Sect. 2, I introduce the widely accepted account of perceptual experience, that is, the content view. By using it, I explain why this problem has attracted much attention in recent years. Next, I consider an argument for the low-level theory and an argument for the high-level theory in turn (Sect. 3 and 4). Both arguments are based on the relation between phenomenal character and perceptual content. I show that both arguments are insufficient in themselves. Finally, I suggest some morals can be drawn from these considerations on the dispute (Sect. 5).