<研究論文(原著論文)>Propositional Attitudes from a Peircean Viewpoint

Abstract

Although Charles S. Peirce proposed a distinctive theory of the mind, it seems that the contemporary philosophy of mind pays insufficient attention to this theory. This article would like to propose a Peircean theory of propositional attitudes, aiming to provide a foundational scheme to reconsider Peirce’s theory of the mind in the contemporary context. In the first section, Quine’s insights into Peirce’s pragmatism are reconsidered; these insights are useful to direct the discussion of this article. It is argued, however, that Quine’s behaviouristic construal of Peirce’s concept of belief needs to be amended. The second section generalises the Peircean theory of propositional attitudes. This theory adopts a functionalistic view instead of a behaviouristic view, and is a polyadic theory. The third section tries to find the right place for the Peircean theory in the contemporary field of the philosophy of mind. The Peircean theory is similar to Fodor’s theory of propositional attitudes in several points. However, there can also be found a distinctive view of the Peircean theory: ‘Peircean-habit semantics’. The fourth section clarifies this view. This article thus demonstrates the contemporary significance of Peirce’s theory of the mind, particularly that of the Peircean theory of propositional attitudes.