ロックとリードによる懐疑主義批判 --プラグマティズム的観点から (新宮一成教授 退職記念号)

Abstract

Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid is said to have strongly criticized the 'theory of ideas'. This was because he considered that such a theory leads to scepticism. Especially he considered that Berkeley and Hume proved it. Of course, John Locke was also one of the targets of Reid's criticism. Interestingly, Reid refers to Locke much more than to Hume in his Essay on Intellectual Powers of Man because he thinks it is important to refute the core of the theory of ideas (that is, Locke's theory) rather than argue about Berkeley or Hume's approaches. It is true that there are many differences between Locke and Reid. The former is a representative theorist of perception and the latter is a direct realist. Reid seems to think that this difference is important in avoiding scepticism. However, I see a great deal of similarity between them in their approach to avoid scepticism, especially in the framework of their epistemology. Their strategy for escape from scepticism is not demonstrative but structural. I mean that they both do not refute scepticism directly by argument, but rather by adopting an epistemological structure by which they can avoid scepticism. The difference between them is in the base of their epistemological structures. Locke based his epistemological structure on science and Reid on common sense. In spite of this difference, I emphasize the similarity in their strategy in this paper and, in addition, point out that their epistemological attitude strongly accords with that of the pragmatists, especially with that of the founder of pragmatism, C. S. Peirce.