熟慮に基づく相対性 --バーナード・ウィリアムズの相対主義説--

Abstract

In this paper, I try to discuss how the 'relativism of distance, ' a theory Bernard Williams develops in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, can be put properly inside his philosophical thought. Williams argues, in this theory, that, when different ethical outlooks of two societies disagree, it is the case whether the members of one society can leave their original outlook and then make that of the other society their own (he calls this case a real confrontation) or they cannot (a notional confrontation), and that, only in the latter case, a kind of relativistic state occurs (that is, it is impossible for them to value ethically the actions or attitudes in the other society). Now, according to Williams, we have to accept the possibility that those members change their outlook in the manner above because we cannot adopt, in trying to understand the ethical practice of a society, the 'objectivist model' which assumes that the disagreement between the two outlooks comes to an end through the convergence achieved on the basis of how things are in the world. Pointing out that the reflective ethical considerations do not possess the characteristics which play an important role in achieving that convergence, he insists that we must refuse the model and, instead of that, adopt the 'nonobjectivist model.' Besides, it is the ability of 'deliberative reasoning, ' handled in his paper 'Internal and external reasons, ' that Williams regards as the ability which enables those members to change their ethical outlook. In the paper, he argues that one has a reason to do any action only if the motive to do it is included in her 'subjective motivational set, ' and that she can find what elements are included in her set by advancing her own deliberative reasoning. Therefore, based on his view, those members come to be able to judge, with their own deliberation, whether the ethical outlook of the other society which seems to disagree with that of their own may be included in their set.