<サーヴェイ論文>知識と有責性 --ギデオン・ローゼンの論証をめぐって

Abstract

Gideon Rosen, in his recent paper, presented a paradox of knowledge and responsibility. He argues that responsible behavior presupposes some form of perfect knowledge and, therefore, there are no cases where an agent can legitimately be attributed the responsibility for his or her action. However, this is contrary to our actual opinion and practice. Consequently, since the publication of Rosen's paper, several philosophers have been attempting to discover a flaw in his argument. According to William FitzPatrick, Rosen set the responsibility criteria unreasonably high. FitzPatrick argues that the necessary premise for responsibility attribution is not the fact that the agent possesses complete knowledge but rather the possibility or expectability of her or his possessing such knowledge. Alternatively, according to Elizabeth Harman, Rosen erroneously supposed that justifiably blaming someone would essentially depend on what he or she knows. Harman argues that regardless of what a wrongdoer subjectively knows, the objective fact that she or he has done something wrong would justify our condemning her or him. According to Matthew Talbert, our natural manner of blaming does not require Rosen's epistemic standard. Talbert argues that the blameworthiness of an agent's behavior is not the function of the knowledge condition satisfied in his or her action, but the function of the meaning expressed in that behavior. My paper aims to examine the debate on Rosen's skeptical challenge and expand our understanding of the relationship between knowledge and responsibility. Specifically, I will introduce Rosen's argument and consider FitzPatrick's, Harman's, and Talbert's counter-arguments, in addition to Neil Levy's pro-argument for Rosen's skepticism.