<論説>不可侵条約をめぐる満州事変前後のソ日関係

Abstract

ソ連は日本に対し、満州事変をはさんで二〇年代後半から、三〇年代はじめにかけて数度にわたり、不可侵条約の締結を提案した。他国と不可侵条約、中立条約を締結していくというのが、この時期のソ連外交の特微であったが、日本はことごとくそれらを拒否した。日本は復交はしたものの、共産主義への警戒から、不可侵条約には応じようとしない例外的な国であった。この態度と満州事変にみられる日本の膨張政策は、ソ連の不安をかきたてずにはおかなかった。満州事変後の、特に中ソ国境での関東軍の動向を、ソ連は大きな関心をもって見つめることになった。本論では、この間のソ連、日本の間で行われていた交渉をあとづけることで、当時のソ連が日本に抱いていた脅威を、明らかにすると同時に、東西挾撃の阻止という、不可侵条約攻勢の背景にある動機から、ソ連外交を説明しようと試みた。

The Soviet Union had proposed many times between the late 1920's and the early 1930's about the negotiation of a nonaggression pact with Japan. During this time the "Manchurian Incident" broke out, on the 18th of September, 1931. Though the tendency of Soviet diplomacy at this time was to conclude the nonaggression pacts and neutrality pacts with other nations, Japan had refused all of the Soviet proposals. The Soviet Union reestablished diplomatic relations with Japan, but for the Soviet Union, Japan was an exceptional nation, in that, for fear of the infiltration of communism, Japan declined the nonaggression pact. This attitude and the Japanese expansion policy, which can be seen explicitly in the Manchurian Incident, all the more stirred up Soviet uneasiness. With great caution, after the Manchurian Incident, the Soviet Union started keeping an eye on the movement of the Kwangtung Army (Kanto Gun) especially along the Chinese-Soviet border. By tracing the negotiations between the Soviet and Japanese governments the Japanese menace to the Soviet Union at that time can be clearly shown. At the same time, this paper will attempt to explain Soviet diplomacy by looking at motivations behind the nonaggression pact tactics, that of keeping east and west nations from advancing, simultaneously.