<論説>アメリカ合衆国の中東政策の形成 : 中東コマンド構想とその遺産 一九五〇～一九五二年

Abstract

一九五〇年代初頭は、中東に対する合衆国独自の目標や行動方針が形成された時期であった。合衆国は、一九四〇年代後半には中東における非公式帝国を保持しようとする英国に事実上依存する消極的な政策をとっていたが、朝鮮戦争勃発後、中東における軍事的責任をめぐる英国との意見対立や同地域諸国の西側陣営からの離反傾向を看過できなくなった。同時に合衆国政府内では、中東諸国との政治的関係強化を主張する国務省と中東への関与に消極的な軍部との対立が生じていた。中東コマンド権想は、一方で中東を巡る米英間の政策調整の舞台となると同時に、他方で合衆国政府内に新たな中東政策コンセンサスを析出せしむる触媒として機能した。トルーマン政権末期までに合衆国の政策決定者たちは、中東全域を強固に西側陣営に組み込み、そして同地域の軍事態勢をも強化するような地域的機構を構築することを長期的な目標として共有するようになり、この目標を実現するための積極的な政策を遂行する態勢を整えていった。そして、合衆国が独自の中東政策を獲得するということは、合衆国が同地域における英国の政策に干渉する傾向を強めることをも意味したのである。

The early 1950s witnessed a significant shift in the American attitude toward the Middle East. For several years after the Second World War, the Americans wishfully hoped that Britain would remain the dominant and stabilizing power in the Middle East, and were in fact trying to rely on the British presence and influence there. By the time the Truman administration left office, however, the United States was prepared to play a more active role in the Middle East in an effort to enlist the region within the Western camp. An ultimately abortive plan to establish a multilateral organization named Middle East Command (MEC) and later Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) functioned as the catalyst that brought about this shift in the American attitude. While American and British officials used this prospective regional organization to orient allied policy in a direction conforming with their objectives, it also became an arena in which diplomats and generals within the US government tied to forge consensus on policy toward the region. This article highlights the regional dimension of the US policy toward the Middle East that emerged in the early 1950s. The most impressive and profound feature of the emergent policy was that its objective was defined firmly in regional terms. The American policymakers came to envisage some regional order or structure that would cover the whole region, promote Middle Easterners' political orientation toward the West, and enable a military strategy based on a forward defense line as their ultimate objective. This regional objective, together with a vaguely defined course of action to implement it, constituted the backdrop of the US policy toward the region for several years to come. Concurrently, the crystallization of the American regional perspective toward the Middle East gradually transformed the character of the Anglo-American relationship over the region. While the US consistently refused to shoulder the burden of substantial military responsibility there, its leaders became more and more inclined to expect the British to play a role within the framework of American policy, and to impose, if necessary, their own prescriptions on their ally across the Atlantic.