<論説>対日講和とアメリカの「太平洋協定」構想 : 国務省における安全保障取極め構想、一九四九―五一年

Abstract

対日講和を機に米国務省内では、ハワードやダレスによって「太平洋協定」構想が考案された。それはアジア太平洋地域における包括的な安全保障枠組みの構築を追求するものであったが、「太平洋版NATO」の役割を期待するアジア太平洋諸国の関心とは異なり、講和を急ぐ国務省は、講和後の米軍駐留や日本再軍備など軍部が求める安全保障上の要請を満たし、同時に「寛大な講和」を早期に実現する「装置」として「太平洋協定」を立案した。その意味で米国の関心は当初より限定的であり、集団防衛体制の構築という観点は実際には二義的なものに過ぎなかった。したがって、一九五一年初頭の東京会談において、米国にとって実質的に満足すべき合意が日米二国間でもたらされると、米国はその後の講和交渉において、包括的な「太平洋協定」を実現するという所期の構想に固執する必要を失い、その結果、日米、ANZUS、米比というそれぞれ性格の異なる個別的な安金保障取極めが締結されることになった。

The short-lived idea of a "Pacific Pact" represented the first attempt by the U.S. Government - or more correctly, the U.S. State Department - to establish a comprehensive security framework in the Asia-Pacific region. Conceived within the context of a peace settlement with Japan, the Pacific Pact was also a child of the Cold War. As envisioned, it was to incorporate Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Philippine, United States and possibly Indonesia. Following the collapse of the United Nations' collective security system, and within the context of subsequent efforts to realize regional collective defense systems as provided for by Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, various nations in the Asia-Pacific pushed for a U.S.-centered regional arrangement similar to that of NATO. For its part, the State Department saw the Pacific Pact as a solution to potential security problems arising from the forthcoming peace with Japan. In this way, the State Department sought through the Pacific Pact to realize an early and generous peace with Japan - which would in turn secure that nation's western orientation - insofar as the Pacific Pact would ensure that U.S. security requirements in Japan were met. In other words, the actual establishment of a regional security system was not high on the State Department's agenda. As a result, American enthusiasm for the Pacific Pact waned after the successful Japanese-American negotiations of early 1951 established the basis for post- occupation U.S.-Japan security relations. In the end, the U.S. concluded a number of individual security arrangements, including the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, the ANZUS Treaty, and the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty. This article examines microscopically the U.S. State Department's designs for a security arrangement, within the context of its thinking regarding a peace settlement with Japan from 1949 to 1951. It focuses on the various proposals of the Special Assistant to Secretary of State John B. Howard and the Special Consultant to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles for a "Pacific Pact." The aim of this article is to reveal the character of the "Pacific Pact, " which has hitherto (144) been considered an "elusive arrangement, " as well as to reveal the role played by the Japanese-American negotiations of 1951 in torpedoing the Pacific Pact. Finally, this article reconsiders the significance of the concept of the "Pacific Pact" as a part of American strategy toward the Asia-Pacific region in the 1950s.