<論説>アトリー労働党政権のポーランド人再定住軍団の編成 : 一九四五―一九四六

Abstract

一九四五年二月のヤルタ会談の結果、ポーランドの東部領土はソ連に併合され、ワルシャワには共産勢力の強い影響を受けた臨時政府が誕生した。当時、ポーランド亡命政府の後見国としてその軍を指揮下においていたイギリス政府は、以降、帰国拒否が予測されたポーランド兵の処遇問題に直面する。四六年初頭、国際的圧力を受けてポーランド軍の解体を迫られたイギリス政府は、帰国拒否兵士の再定住先を模索したが、諸外国だけでなく、英連邦諸国、植民地など帝国内部からも好意的な反応は得られなかった。他に受け入れ先がないなか、最終的に四六年五月、イギリス政府はポーランド兵を国内に受け入れ、その定住を支援する組織としてポーランド人再定住軍団を編成することを決定した。 従来、ポーランド人の受け入れの背景としては、国内の労働力需要が指摘されてきた。しかし、その受け入れ、再定住政策は、対ポーランド政策に留まらない、イギリスのより広範な対外政策によって規定されていたのである。

As a result of World War II, Poland lost much of its eastern territory to the Soviet Union, in return for substantial accessions of territory in the north and west. Furthermore, the Polish government in-exile in London was disfranchised and, instead, a new Polish provisional government under communist control was formed. At that time, the Polish armed force in-exile, consisting of more than 200, 000 men, was under British command. The Attlee government (1945 1951) feared the possibility that these foreign servicemen might remain on their hands. Nonetheless, against the backdrop of a manpower shortage facing the British Army, it feared the possible insurgency of this large foreign force and could not afford to take a strong stand against it. As a temporary expedient, the Attlee government employed this force in the occupation of Germany and Italy. However, at the beginning of 1946, the international situation forced Britain to disband these Polish forces. Having done so, it sought unsuccessfully to emigrate these servicemen to, particularly, British colonies and Dominions. With no alternative in sight, the Attlee government in May 1946 decided to allow them to settle in Britain and to form the so-called Polish Resettlement Corps. By the end of the 1940s, some 120.000 Poles, including dependants of Polish ex-servicemen, had settled in Britain. They constituted not only the majority of the Polish community in Britain, but also one of the largest foreign constituencies in immediate postwar Britain. In their examination of the British decision-making process vis-a-vis the Poles, previous works have emphasized postwar Britain's manpower needs. In contrast, this essay considers the question in the broader context of postwar British foreign policy, and in particular, its policy vis-a-vis Italy.