<論説>北京関税特別会議とワシントン条約後の東アジア秩序の変容 : イギリスの外交・帝国政策と日本

Abstract

本稿は、一九二五年十月より開催された北京関税特別会議の経過と、それがワシントン条約後の東アジア秩序に持った意味を再検討したものである。ワシントン条約は、列強間の国際会議により、中国の地方政府収入となっていた釐金を廃止し、中央政府の歳入となる関税率の増加を実現していくことを規定していた。会議に際してイギリスは、会議が中国の中央政府と地方政府の間の関税増収分の分配を図ることで、両者の政治的経済的関係の調整を積極的に図るべきとした。イギリスは、当時の英米関係や帝国政策を背景として、ワシントン条約を中国の安定化に対する列強の協力的な態度の象徴として、またイギリスが中国に様々な影響力を行使するための手段として利用しようとしていた。対して日本の幣原外交は、中国政府の国際的責任感の自発的な形成を期待して中国への不干渉政策をとっており、関税会議に対しても、中国政府自身の努力に応じて二・五％以上の増税を実施し、増税分を中国政府の再建のための費用に充てるという方針を定めた。幣原の方針は、彼の新たな日中関係への志向という文脈の中で評価すべきものである。会議の失敗後、日本は中国政府の自主的再建を静観する方針を取ったのに対し、イギリスは北伐を開始していた中国国民党への宥和政策に踏み切った。イギリスは、中国のナショナリズムへの宥和を図ることは、むしろワシントン条約に基づく東アジア秩序の安定化に資するものであり、したがってそれは長期的にはアメリカおよび日本との協力的な関係の再建にも役立つものと考えており、それによりワシントン条約を中国における新たな状況に適応させようとしたのである。

This paper reconsiders the progress of the Special Tardif Conference in Beijing (1925-1926) and its meanings for the East Asian international order after the conclusion of the Washington Treaties of 1922. We already have a detailed study about the conference by Katsumi Usui, but it has the following two problems : firstly, it shows insufficient understanding of the original Japanese proposal to the conference resulting from an inadequate grasp of the entire range of Japanese policy ; and secondly, it focuses chiefly on Japanese policy and pays scant attention to those of Britain and the United States. This paper examines the character of policies of Japan, Britain and the United States for the conference comparatively. Great stress has been placed on British and Japanese policy, especially on the former, because it played the most important role in the development of the situation before and after the conference. In the Washington Treaties, it was prescribed that Chinese custom duties of 5% should be raised by 2.5% under conditions set by the powers at the conference, and by another 2.5-7.5% on the condition of the abolition of likin, a transit duty imposed on commodities by Chinese provincial governments, as well as other conditions set by the conferees. This surtax would become revenue for the Chinese central government, and the Washington Treaties therefore attempted to strengthen the financial basis of the Chinese central government and its ability to control provincial governments in order to stabilize the Chinese political and economic situations. The original British plan for the conference proposed that the conference take a comprehensive initiative in coordinating political and economic relations between the Chinese central and provincial governments by dividing increased tax revenues among them. That policy was formed in close connection with general British foreign and imperial policies. After the end of World War I Britain took the initiative in reconstructing the European economy in cooperation with United States and attempted to adjust the British Empire to the ideal of national self-determination by supporting the formation of self-governing administrations in non-European states under the British direct or indirect rule. British foreign policy toward China was also formed to rehabilitate the Chinese political and economic situation in cooperation with United States and Japan, using the Washington Treaties as a symbol of their supportive attitudes toward the non-European states and a means by which Britain could exercise its influence on China. On the other hand, Japanese foreign policy toward China after the conclusion of the Washington Treaties, especially that of Kijuro Shidehara, the foreign minister of the Takaaki Kato Cabinet formed in 1924, attempted to change the style of Japanese foreign policy toward China into one more appropriate to a first class power. Shidehara, conscious of the ideals of the Washington Treaties concerning Chinese reconstruction, adopted a policy of non-interference in China as his diplomatic principle, looking forward to the formation of the Chinese government's sense of international responsibility, which he regarded as an important premise of her reconstruction and the stabilization of Japanese-Chinese relations. Based on that principle, Shidehara decided the policy for the Tariff Conference, to the effect that a 2.5% surtax should be used to liquidate China's unsecured debts (Shidehara hoped this would raise the credibility of the Chinese government) and a surtax of more than 2.5% should be put into effect depending on the Chinese government's efforts, including the abolition of likin. This revenue would be used for the reconstruction and the reorganization of Chinese administration. In addition, Japan made a decision during the proceedings of the Conference that tax rates on various commodities should be raised to increase the revenue of China. Many studies, including that of Usui, have given too much attention to Shidehara's demands for liquidation of unsecured debts, which has been regarded as the pursuit of Japanese exclusive interests. It should, however, be interpreted in the context of his orientation to the new Japanese-Chinese relationship. After the failure of the conference, caused by the collapse of the Chinese central government, British and Japanese foreign policies showed contrastive reactions to the newly arising situation. Japan took a policy of watching and waiting for the formation of an effective Chinese government, but Britain took a policy of appeasing the Kuomintang, which started the expedition from Kwangtung to the north, and declared a new domestic tax of 2.5% on commodities. Although the declaration adopted the same tax rate as that prescribed in the Washington Treaties, it was intended instead to impose another new transit duty. In December 1926, however, Britain issued a statement permitting China the surtax of 2.5% in the spirit of the Washington Treaties. Although Japan and the United States were strongly opposed to that measure, Britain had considered that appeasing Chinese nationalism, even if on the provincial government level, would help the stabilization of the East Asian order based on the Washington Treaties and therefore the reconstruction of cooperative relationships with the United States and Japan in the long term as well. In this sense, Britain never denied the validity of the Washington Treaties, but attempted to make elastic adjustments to them in line with the changing situation in China. That was the consistent strategy of British foreign policy.