<論説>一九五〇年代の在日朝鮮人政策と北朝鮮帰還事業 : 帰国運動の展開過程を軸に

Abstract

一九五九年二月一二日、岸信介内閣によって決定された在日朝鮮人の北朝鮮帰還事業の背景には、五年以上の検討期間があった。その間の日本赤十字社と日本政府の役割をめぐっては、研究者の間で意見の相違がある。本稿では、この課題を再検討することを目的として、在日朝鮮人の帰国運動の変遷とそれに伴う帰還計画の変更を論じる。五二年の主権回復後、日本政府の方針と在日朝鮮人運動との対立は激しく、在日朝鮮人政策は限界点に達しつつあった。そのなかで、五三年の朝鮮戦争休戦協定後に浮上した北朝鮮帰還問題は、この状況にひとつの打開策を提示する。一方、在日朝鮮人の帰国運動は、運動団体の再編等を経てその目的や規模を転換してゆく。その過程で生じた帰国運動側の要求との対立は、韓国との外交問題とともに、日本政府が帰還事業を実施する上で大きな障害となった。本稿では、これらの矛盾を乗り越えて岸内閣が閣議了解に至る過程を考察する。

With the restoration of sovereignty in Apr. 28, 1952, Japanese government established a legal framework centered on the Immigration Control Act and the Alien Register Law on the basis of the experience under the allied occupation. However, this system which was based on forced repatriation and control of resident aliens ground to a halt in the face of the South Korean government's refusal to accept repatriates and the struggle for the human right to a livelihood by Minsen (the United Democratic Front of Korea in Japan). The problem of repatriation of Koreans in Japan to North Korea had emerged around the time of the armistice agreement of Korean War in 1953, and it seemed to offer a solution to a difficult situation, but at the same time it threatened to exacerbate tensions with South' Korea and pique the wariness of Koreans in Japan. From this standpoint, the Japanese government recognized the need to play an inconspicuous role in the repatriation process that would deflect domestic and foreign criticism. Faced with demands from opposition parties, the Japanese government explored the possibility of bilateral negotiations with North Korea through the meditation of the Japanese Red Cross Society. The Red Cross proposed in the telegram to the North Korean Red Cross Society in Jan. 6, 1954 to aid the resident Koreans in Japan by repatriating them using the ships and routes that had been used to repatriate Japanese nationals from the Korean Peninsula. However, this bilateral method conducted between the two Red Cross societies had to be altered because of changes in the return movement. The character of Soren (the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan), which had been established in May 1955, became increasingly subject to North Korean government policy as it took on the character of a diplomatic mission, and this change in stance was reflected in the return movement. While Minsen had advocated that the return of resident Koreans in Japan was a matter of the "freedom of go abroad, " an individual's human right, Soren developed the return movement more systematically in synchronization with the policy of North Korean government, holding meetings for applicants wishing to return and thereby clearly demonstrated the number of applicants. With the change of return movement, Shimazu Tadatsugu, the president of the Japanese Red Cross Society asked the ICRC (the International Committee of the Red Cross) to intervene in the repatriation project. Attached to the telegram that Shimazu sent to the ICRC was letter from Soren's Tokyo Assembly of Resident Koreans Seeking Repatriation, which Shimazu described as "not a petition but a request" and suggested its political and collective character. The intention of the Japanese side in asking for the intervention of the ICRC was to emphasis the humanitarian aspects of the project in order to persuade the South Korean government and contain the political influence of the North Korean government. Kishi Nobusuke, who had assumed the premiership on Feb. 25, 1957, made a point of emphasizing relations with South Korea but preferred to minimize the role of Japanese government in the repatriation project. It was following the summer of 1958 when the repatriation movement had gown massively that the situation changed into one advantageous to Kishi. Due to the resolution of Soren in Aug. 12 to ask the Japanese government to guarantee repatriation, the addresses of North Korean Prime Minister Kim Il-Sung in Sept. 8 expressing his welcome for Koreans from Japan, and that of Foreign Minister Nam Il in Dec. 30 expressing North Korean willingness to provide ships for the return, the number of applicants for repatriation increased sharply. And in Japan, "public opinion charging the Kishi administration with failing to implement the humanitarian endeavor of the repatriation project" formed. In these circumstances, the Kishi administration approved the repatriation project in Feb. 13, 1959, without giving the impression that the Japanese government was promoting the project. By sustaining its passive stance, the Japanese government achieved its goal of carrying out an "expulsion policy" in a fashion that minimized the role of the government and guaranteed humanitarianism while also maintaining both the principle of not permitting reentry as an immigration control measure and the basic framework of its diplomatic policy. The government whose policy regarding Koreans in Japan had seemed to have reached an impasse arrived at a tentative solution without responding to the demands of the movement by Korean residents or by modifying its basic policy towards Koreans in Japan.