<論説>EECにおける「加速」の決定と欧州統合の進展 : フランスの立場を中心に (一九五九―一九六〇)

Abstract

一九六〇年五月のEEC閣僚理事会の決定に基づき、EECは域内関税の撤廃日程を前倒しにする、「加速」と呼ばれる措置の実施を決定した。このことは従来、欧州統合が順調に進展していたことの証左として理解されてきた。しかしながら、「加速」を支持し、積極的にその実現を目指したフランスの対応を分析すると、この理解が一面的に過ぎることが明らかになる。フランス政府の眼目は、「加速」を利用してEECの国際関係上の地位を確立することにあった。そのためには「加速」において、対外共通関税の導入を定めることが必要と考えられたが、他の加盟国にとってそれは受け入れがたいものであった。アメリカが欧州統合のあり方に積極的に介入を始めたことで、「加速」における対外共通関税の導入の可能性が高まったが、更にフランス政府は「加速」の成立を確かなものとするために、従来関税撤廃と並行して共通政策の実施を求めてきた立場を放棄することを決定した。こうして成立した「加速」はフランスの外交的な思惑に大きく影響を受けたものとなり、EECが執り行う政策も関税撤廃を中心とするものに留まることとなった。

The decision to implement the mechanism known as "acceleration" to bring forward the date of the introduction of Common External Tariff, CET, was based of a determination of the Council of the European Economic Community in May, 1960. As a result, the EEC removed internal trade barriers and succeeded in establishing the Common Market earlier than scheduled. As there has not been research done using primary sources to verify the decision-making process on the acceleration policy, I have focused in particular on the position of France in this paper and re-examined the relationship of the decision to accelerate and the progress of European integration. In the first section, I analyze the background to the proposal for acceleration and the three proposals by the ECC Commission, Belgium, and France The most important problem for the EEC in 1959 when the acceleration policy was proposed was how to deal with various Western European countries that were not members of the EEC, such as the United Kingdom. These nations had begun to move toward the formation of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). They subsequently demanded that the EEC member states grant them the tariff reductions in place within the EEC system, and the six EEC nations were in disagreement over how to deal with this demand. In contrast to Benelux countries' position that the EFTA's proposal should be accommodated, France rejected this idea Behind the proposals of France and Belgium toward acceleration can be seen definite policy differences regarding non-member nations. Although the two countries agreed on the point of altering the rate of tariff reductions from 10 to 20 percent on July 1, 1960, in contrast to France's proposal to introduce CET simultaneously with acceleration, Belgium opposed this move. The decision whether to include the introduction of CET within the acceleration policy meant deciding whether EEC would give special consideration to EFTA or not. In the second section I analyze how the positions of each country drew closer and also the process of determining the outline of the policy of acceleration. The French proposal intending to incorporate the CET within the acceleration policy was criticized not only by the Benelux countries but also by West Germany and the United States. The reason for this is that West Germany was the Ration that would be forced to raise tariff rates to the greatest extent due to the CET, and if that came about, there was fear that it would have a negative impact on the country's economy. The United States shared West German fears and criticized the French proposal for its negative impact on the European economy. However, at the same time the United States opposed the formation of the EFTA that was planned by the UK. This was because the US felt the demand by the EFTA to have the tariff reductions within the EEC applied to itself was an action that ignored the interests of non-Western-European states as exemplified by the US. For that reason, the US along with France opposed EEC acceptance of EFTA demands. The dispute among the EEC nations moved toward a resolution due to this American position. In addition, France responded to West German and American criticism by reducing the CET to 20%. As a result of this process, the six nations began to form a consensus on incorporating the CET into the acceleration policy. However, there remained an additional problem that France had to solve. The problem was how to deal with the acceleration policy in fields other than tariffs. France had originally demanded the construction of common policies (e.g. a common agricultural policy, a common social policy, and common transport policies) in tandem with the removal of tariffs for member states. This was because they felt that French industry could not withstand a sudden sharp increase in competition. Nonetheless, the report prepared as the initial draft on acceleration by the EEC Commission was insufficient in regard to cooperation on the development of common policies. Despite this fact, as the French government brought up for debate the issue of common policies, the negotiations met with difficulty, and it was feared that the acceleration policy would end in failure. In the end, the French government decided to abandon its original position seeking common policies, and priority was given to using acceleration to settle relations between the EEC and non-member states. Finally, in the third section I address the final decision for acceleration. The general outline of the acceleration had been decided, but the issue of agricultural products remained unresolved. The Netherlands demanded that the liberalization of agricultural trade be incorporated into the acceleration policy and West Germany strongly opposed this. France decided here also to follow the position of the Netherlands based on the standpoint that the implementation of the acceleration policy was the top priority. France hardened its position on the goal of introducing CET by way of the acceleration mechanism and, as a result of various compromises, the decision for acceleration came to have great influence on the nature of the EEC. Just as France had sought, the EEC no longer needed to build a special relationship with the EFTA, but on the other hand, France's abandoning of the goal of the implementing common policy was one cause of the limiting of the EEC's role to tariff reduction.