<論説>沖縄返還交渉と朝鮮半島情勢 : B52沖縄配備に着目して

Abstract

本稿は、ベトナム戦争中の一九六八年二月に行われた沖縄へのB52配備の背景に、朝鮮半島の安保危機があったことを明らかにし、その後の朝鮮半島情勢と沖縄現地の動向が沖縄返還交渉に与えた影響を分析した。沖縄では、B52配備への反発も一因となり、同年一一月の首長選挙で革新政権が成立し、その直後にB52墜落爆発事故が起きたことから、B52撤去を求め一九六九年二月にゼネストが計画された。結果的にゼネストは回避されたが、これらの事態から日米両政府は沖縄返還が不可避だと認識し、沖縄返還交渉が本格化した。返還による沖縄基地の弱体化を恐れた韓国政府は、沖縄の基地機能維持を求め日米に積極的に働きかけを行った。一九六九年四月に起きた北朝鮮による米軍偵察機EC121撃墜事件は、沖縄基地の重要性を日米韓各政府に再認識させ、沖縄住民が「即時無条件全面返還」を主張したにもかかわらず、一九六九年一一月に基地機能を維持したままの施政権返還が決定された。

The B52 is a large strategic bomber that can be equipped with nuclear weapons. The U.S. Air Force used B52s for carpet-bombing in Vietnam during the Vietnam War. They deployed B52s in Okinawa in February 1968. However, the initial purpose of the deployment of the B52s in Okinawa was to prepare for a potential crisis on the Korean Peninsula The deployment of B52s and the campaign for their removal from Okinawa had an effect on the U.S.-Japan negotiations on the reversion of Okinawa. The purpose of this study is to reveal the correlation between the Okinawa reversion negotiations and the security crisis on the Korean Peninsula. In 1965, the U.S. staged a full-scale military intervention in Vietnam. The Republic of Korea (ROK), an ally of the U.S. decided to send troops to Vietnam in 1965. This became a factor behind the annual increase in provocations by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) after the latter half of 1966. On the other hand, in Okinawa and Japan, calls for reversion of Okinawa and the antiwar movement rose, and negotiations on reversion began between the Japanese and the U.S. governments. Provocations from the DPRK reached a climax in the beginning of 1968. The Blue House Raid and the Pueblo incident occurred in succession. This security crisis on the Korean Peninsula greatly shocked both the ROK and the U.S. governments to the extent that the U.S. deployed B52s in Okinawa in readiness for a further crisis on the Korean Peninsula. And because of the Tet Offensive in Vietnam, the U.S. began to fly B52s from Okinawa to attack Vietnam, so a large antiwar movement calling for the removal of the planes arose in Okinawa and Japan. The first election for the Chief Executive of the Ryukyu Government in Okinawa was scheduled for November 1968, so the Japanese government, some U.S. government officials and the U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR) feared that the existence of the B52s would have a negative influence upon the election. They tried to remove the B52s before the election, but the U.S. military authorities were tenaciously opposed to their removal, emphasizing the situation in Vietnam and the Korean Peninsula. In the ROK, fears for the safety of the ROK intensified after the security crisis, and some South Koreans advocated that the U.S. should relocate U.S. bases in Okinawa to Cheju. The U.S. government refused this move because the cost would have been prohibitive. On the other hand, the Japanese government began to recognize that the security of the ROK was indispensable to that of Japan. As a result of the November Chief Executive election, a reformist administration was formed in Okinawa. A week after the election, a B52 bomber crashed there, and large removal campaign, which included the possibility of a general strike, occurred. Although the general strike was avoided, both the U.S. and Japanese governments were anxious about the situation in Okinawa so they quickened negotiations on Okinawan reversion. On the other hand, the ROK was apprehensive that Japan would insist that the U.S. bases be removed from Okinawa when it was returned to Japan. Therefore, the ROK strongly insisted that the U.S. and Japanese governments not weaken Okinawa's military facilities. In April 1969, the DPRK air force shot down a U.S. Navy Lockheed EC121, so the ROK's fear about security increased. The U.S. and Japanese governments also recognized the importance of the bases in Okinawa anew, but they were concerned that the ROK's approach would have the opposite effect on Japanese and Okinawan public opinion. As a result, the two governments guaranteed the ROK in secret that Okinawa's base facilities would not be weakened because of the reversion. In Okinawa, after the avoidance of general strike, the anti-B52 movement remained quiet for several months. However, in July 1969, an U.S. media reported that poison gas was stored in several places on Okinawa. In addition, as the B52s were not removed because of the downing of the ECI21, Okinawans gradually lost confidence in the Japanese and U.S. governments. In October, Kyodo news service reported that a few B52's deployed in Okinawa were on Nuclear Patrol over the DPRK and China, so Okinawans' distrust increased. Under such circumstances, the Okinawan Chief Executive strongly insisted on the "immediate, unconditional, complete return of the bases" to the Japanese government. In November 1969, the U.S. and Japanese governments explicitly decided that Okinawa would be returned to Japan without nuclear weapons and on the same basis as mainland Japan by 1972. However, they again assured the ROK government in secret that the reversion would not weaken Okinawan base facilities. This was also the first embodiment of the JAPAN-U.S.-ROK triangular relationship. However, the U.S. and Japanese governments regarded the Okinawan residents' movement as a destabilizing factor, and the aspirations that the residents had harbored in the reversion were not fulfilled.