<論説>大正初期の「剰余金支出」問題 : 第二次大隈内閣期を中心として

Abstract

予算超過・予算外支出に関する議会の事後承諾の規定(第六四条第二項) を持つ大日本帝国憲法の下では、「責任支出」とも呼ばれた、国庫剰余金その他を財源とする予算超過・予算外支出(「剰余金支出」) が行われた。本稿は、大正初期の「剰余金支出」問題を題材に、憲法の運用をめぐって内閣と議会との間に如何なる論理が展開されていたのかを描くものである。内閣と議会は、「剰余金支出」について、憲法上の根拠を棚上げすることで国政の円滑な運営に不可欠な処置として支出を認めつつも、支出への疑義を残すことで議会の予算審議の完全な形骸化を抑制するという、曖昧さを秘めた解釈を志向していた。さらに「剰余金支出」は、緊急勅令(憲法第八条) や緊急財政処分(第七〇条) などの「臨時」・「緊急」対策を代替する役割を期待されており、「剰余金支出」をめぐって内閣は、議会との関係のみならず、それらの審議を行う枢密院の解釈と意向を踏まえる必要もあったのである。

Article 64, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution of the Empire of Japan (Any and all expenditures overpassing the appropriations set forth in the Titles and Paragraphs of the Budget, or that are not provided for in the Budget, shall subsequently require the approbation of the Imperial Diet.) stipulates that the consent of the Imperial Diet is necessary when a budget overrun or expenditure not provided for in the budget occurs. The Reserve Fund (Article 69) covers these expenditures. Furthermore, when a budget overrun or expenditures in excess of the budget exceeded the fixed amount of the Reserve Fund, "surplus expenditure, " or "expenditure on the responsibility of the cabinet" as addressed in the Constitution, was often covered from the surplus of the national treasury. This article, with a focus on the second Okuma cabinet, explores arguments exchanged between the Cabinet and Diet regarding surplus expenditure as well as how "urgent" and "extraordinary" circumstances and surplus expenditures were interpreted during the early Taisho period. The Constitution of the Empire of Japan stipulated emergency ordinances (Article 8) and emergency financial actions (Article 70) as "urgent" and "extraordinary" measures, but their scope of application was limited. Surplus expenditure was proposed as a more feasible "urgent" and "extraordinary" measure. The Diet questioned the expenditure from the start, but interpreting it as an "expenditure on the responsibility of the cabinet" and thus allowing questions of constitutionality to be evaded eventually became popular. This rather ambiguous interpretation permitted the expenditure as indispensible in terms of the smooth operation of the government and also prevented the Diet's budgetary discussions from losing all substance, and maintaining doubt about the constitutionality of the expenditure it thereby satisfied two contradictory demands. In addition, the mutual understanding between the Cabinet, which would restrict the expenditure to the minimum, and the Diet, which would approve the expenditure, was necessary to preserve this ambiguity. This tacit agreement on surplus expenditure and its interpretation was derived from the changing relationship between the Cabinet and Diet over time, or perhaps may have served as the foundation for the two parties to establish a relationship itself. The interpretation of the budget between the Cabinet and the Diet required an equilibrium that sometimes went beyond theories. This subject of surplus expenditure was actively debated during the second Okuma cabinet. Heated debate within and outside of the Diet reflected domestic political conditions at the time, including alternating Cabinets and changes in the relationship between the Cabinet and Diet and power within the Diet The second k Okuma cabinet, which was already faced with economic challenges arising from World War I, made the decision to implement a surplus expenditure in line with criticism from the Privy Council regarding interpretation of the "urgent" and "extraordinary" clauses. This event confirms the fact that regulation on surplus expenditure required synchronization with the interpretation of the "urgent" and "extraordinary" clauses in addition to dealing with the problem by increasing the reserve fund. Furthermore, one can also note that the second Okuma cabinet's surplus expenditure were seen as having the character of "economic-policy spending" as in that for rice market regulation and protection of the silk reeling industry, which also sparked criticism for being arbitrary. These expenditures were sought as an alternative method functioning as an surplus expenditure scheme that was based on the unanticipated interpretation of Article 8 and Article 70 by the Privy Council. However, when approval of the expenditure was submitted after the fact to the Diet, the majority of the House of Representatives had no other choice but to accept it as members of the ruling party, but the House of Peers and others within and outside of the Diet criticized the action. Thus, questioning of surplus expenditures became more evident and the need to change the constitutional interpretation through mitigation of the application of Article 8 and Article 70 arose. The second Okuma cabinet failed to modify its interpretation, however, and could not formulate a new alternative to surplus expenditure in order to respond to "urgent" and "extraordinary" circumstances. They were consequently forced to considerably delay establishment of immediate "economic policies" whose necessity was expected to increase. The interpretation of "expenditure on the responsibility of the cabinet" is not perfectly logical in the context of "constitutionalism." But the continuity and the stability of the interpretation held by the Cabinet and the Diet was emphasized, In the Early Taisho Period, the fact that the policies of the Cabinet and the expectations of the political parties underwent great strain as they at times undermined the ideals of constitutionalism and the parliamentarianism, by which the two were also bound, arose as a incipient and practical issue.