<論説>ボスニア・ヘルツェゴヴィナ併合問題の再検討 : 共通財務相I・ブリアーンによる二つの『建白書』を中心に

Abstract

本稿は、ボスニア・ヘルツェゴヴィナ併合(一九〇八年一○月) を題材として、ハプスブルク独特の二重帝国体制に従来とは異なる角度から光をあてることを目的とする。とくに今回は、他の首脳に先がけて併合を上奏した共通財務相ブリアーンに着目する。具体的には彼による二つの『建自書』を中心に、併合に至るハプスブルク国内の動向の検討から、オーストリアとハンガリーの枠組みをこえた帝国全体に関わる案件(「共通案件」) の決定過程を浮き彫りにする。考察の結果、ブリアーンが占領状態に起因する民族運動をおさえるために併合を発意したこと、ブリアーンの計画が共通外務相エーレンタールらの影響を受けつつも、併合への道筋を整えたことが示される。ただし、ハプスブルク家の継承法(「国事詔書」) をめぐる折衝の不調は、ボスニアの「合法的」な併合を不可能とした。ここからは、帝国中枢における政策決定の多元性と機能不全がみてとれるのである。

The right of the Austro-Hungarian (Habsburg) Empire to occupy, not to annex, Bosnia-Herzegovina was recognized on the basis of Article 25 of the Berlin Treaty. The Habsburgs maintained this provisional status in both provinces until 1908. When the revolution of the Young Turks in Constantinople broke out in July 1908, the possibility that the new regime in Turkey would demand the restoration of sovereignty over these provinces arose, and the problem of the annexation by the Habsburg Empire became a matter of great urgency. Alois Lexa Aehrenthal, Common Foreign Minister of the Habsburg Empire (1906-1912), negotiated with Russia for a secret agreement in order to successfully annex the provinces. In order to secure the Habsburg's share of the bargain, he unilaterally declared the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina on 6 October 1908. From that time onward the relationship between the Habsburg Empire and Russia became aggravated, and this affair is regarded as the prelude to First World War in diplomatic history. But many researchers have ignored the impact of annexation on the Habsburg constitutional system. I point out that it was lstvan Burian, the Common Finance Minister of the Habsburg Empire (1903-1912), who proposed the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina for the first time, In other words, Burian presented memoranda proposing the annexation to Emperor Franz Joseph. I would like to emphasize the influence of both Burian's documents on Habsburg foreign policy as an imperial (common) affair, which was decided not only by Emperor and Common Foreign Minister, but also by the governments of Austria and Hungary. Also, historiographic studies do not pay sufficient attention to the anomalous status of Bosnia-Herzegovina under Habsburg Dualism. In short, these provinces formed a common administrative district, neither part of Austria nor of Hungary. If this status were to be changed, it would require special legislation on which both the parliaments of Austria and Hungary would have to agree. Based on such an understanding of the current scholarship, this article focuses on the development of the annexation that involved the emperor, common ministers, governments and parliaments of Austria and Hungary. In the first section. I describe the contents of the first Burian's memorandum of May 1907. His conception may be summed up in three main points. First, the transitional legal status of the occupation of Bosnia- Herzegovina allowed various underground and illegal activities by Serbia. Second, it was necessary to reduce public discontent with the central regime. As regards this matter, Burian intended to expand autonomy after annexation was achieved. Third, when these provinces were annexed to the Habsburg Empire, Bosnia-Herzegovina would be incorporated into Hungary to maintain Dualism. He intended to avoid radical change to the existing system of government, that is to say, to prevent falling into tripartism (Austria-Hungary-South Slav). The second section deals with differences regarding annexation between Burian and Aehrenthal. Aehrenthal approved in principle of the necessity of annexation at the ministerial conference of December 1907, but he opposed the immediate action and the alteration of the legal status of Bosnia- Herzegovina under the Habsburg government. That is why Burian presented a second memorandum to Franz Joseph in April 1908. The purport of second memorandum was similar to the first memorandum on the whole, but there were remarkable discrepancies between the two memoranda in the details. First, Burian pressed Franz Joseph more strongly to decide on annexation. Second, Bosnia-Herzegovina was to remain a common administrative district after annexation. Third, Burian made concrete plans for the political system of Bosnia-Herzegovina. On one hand, Bosnia-Herzegovina would participate in decision making on local affairs, but on the other hand, it would not have rights to decide imperial issues such as military and foreign policy. However, Aehrenthal opposed annexation on this occasion because of the broad effect it would have on the European powers and his apprehension about unilaterally renouncing the Berlin Treaty, Aehrenthal thus rejected Burian's proposal. The third section focuses on the discussion of the common cabinet on the eve of annexation. Following the revolution of the Young Turks, Ahrenthal completely accepted Burian's conception of annexation and local autonomy. Therefore, the two cooperated closely thereafter. Aehrenthal concentrated more attention on the problem of the Habsburg constitution rather than the reaction of the European powers. He aimed to pass an annexation law that was founded on the Habsburg's succession law (in German, Pragmatische Sanktion) in the Austrian and Hungarian parliaments. However, on this occasion, Hungarian Prime Minister Sandor Wekerle claimed Hungary's historic rights in Bosnia-Herzegovina on the basis of the Habsburg's law of succession. Aehrenthal and Austria Prime Minister Max Wladimir Beck opposed Wekerle's assertion as groundless. They could not find a way to settle the disagreement, and in the end the annexation law was never established. The content of my analysis may be summarized as follows: (1) We should not overestimate Burian's role in the annexation attempt, but his memoranda not only stimulated leading circles of the Habsburg Empire to consider annexation but also helped matters develop more smoothly in Vienna after the revolution of the Young Turks. As Burian himself later wrote, we should regard him as the true proponent of annexation. (2) As we have seen in the examination of the annexation law, the decision-making process for imperial affairs was very complicated and lacked a coordinating function. A full account of annexation reveals the pluralistic and inefficient policymaking of the Habsburg Empire.