<論説>第二次台湾海峡危機とアメリカ合衆国の台湾政策 : 一九五〇年代後半における台湾政策の変容をもたらした、歴史的ダイナミズムの解明に向けて (特集 : 海)

Abstract

一九五〇年半ば以降、中国共産党政権(以下、中国) に次第に接近する国際社会と対中封じ込めを堅持するアメリカ合衆国(以下、米国) との間の摩擦、そして、それと表裏一体をなす国民党政権(以下、国府) の、また国府を支える米国の国際的孤立は深刻化する一方であった。五八年晩夏に勃発した第二次台湾海峡危機は、かかる摩擦や孤立を「限界点」にまで悪化させ、米国は、台湾海峡での「分断固定化」―対中封じ込めと台湾の確保を中核的要素とし、海峡を含む極東地域の安定を目指す秩序―が崩壊しかねない事態に直面したのである。そこで米国は、国際社会における国府のイメージの改善と訴求力の向上により、上記の摩擦や孤立のさらなる悪化を防ごうとしたのであった。危機終息後、米国は、経済体制をめぐる国共間の争いにおいて国府を勝利へ導くことでその訴求力を更に高めるべく、台湾での経済成長の実現に注力し、そして、危機後のこうした新たな台湾政策は、六〇年代台湾における輸出主導型経済への転換を促す外在的誘因となったのである。

In the summer of 1955 shortly after the resolution of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, a newer form of political order called the "establishment of separation" arose in the Taiwan Strait. The core elements of this system were containment of China and security for Taiwan with the aim of stability in the Far East, including the Strait, as the embodiment of the Eisenhower administration's (hereafter the administration) thinking. Under this system, the administration's Taiwan policy of the mid-1950s then emphasized strengthening the military of the Republic of China (hereafter the ROC) and political stability within Taiwan, and the long-term economic development of Taiwan was subordinated to these political demands. However, four years later there was a conspicuous change in the character of the policy. From 1959 the administration repeatedly pressured the ROC to restrain military spending that was impinging on Taiwan's economic development, and at the end of the same year hinted at the termination of economic assistance in the near future, pushing the ROC to promote systematic economic reform to make economic growth possible and enable Taiwan's economic self-sufficiency. The character of Taiwan policy changed as the economy became the first priority. The author believes the key to understanding the historic dynamism that brought about this change was the actions of international society toward the People's Republic of China (hereafter the PRC). After the mid 1950s the Chinese presence in the Far East rapidly strengthened, and accordingly friction between the United States and international society over the proper response to China heightened. In contrast to the United States that was unrelenting in its negative stance toward China under its policy of containment, international society gradually strengthened its position of rapprochement with China. Furthermore, this movement in international society and the negative influence that the international isolation of the ROC as well as that of the administration that supported it imposed on the security of Taiwan were two sides of the same coin. Additionally, this friction and isolation risked violently shaking the "establishment of separation." With the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis that erupted in the last weeks of August in 1958, this risk became reality. The ROC-controlled island of Jinmen was subjected to large-scale bombardment by the PRC, and the administration made clear its position in support of the ROC's defense of the island and strengthened its stance in opposition to China, but in response, international society strongly opposed the U, S. stance. As a result, by the beginning of October the friction and isolation resulting from the crisis reached the breaking point, and the administration was faced with a situation in which the "establishment of separation" might be destroyed To prevent this destruction, the administration then attempted to improve the external image of the ROC as the sole legitimate Chinese government, and by promoting this appeal tried to curtail the further rapprochement of international society with China. Then, on the 23rd of October, in the joint communique issued after the meeting of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who was visiting Taiwan, and President Chiang Kai-shek, the ROC deviated from its previous policy of the overthrow of Communist China by military force. In publicizing its new stance of seeking a return to the mainland through peaceful means, it achieved for the time being its long-sought objective of raising the external appeal of the ROC. However, the administration did not feel that this result alone would be a solution preventing the disquieting prospect of the destruction of the "establishment of separation." Given the aforementioned movement of international society that had begun prior to the crisis and which showed every prospect of continuing and after the crisis as well, the administration was fully cognizant of the necessity of constantly enhancing the ROC's image by the external display of the systematic superiority of the ROC over the PRC. The U.S. then sought a means of realizing high growth in the Taiwanese economy within the liberal system, and with that goal in mind it put genuine pressure on the ROC from 1959. As noted above, the demands on the ROC for systematic reform at the end of the same year were nothing other than the result of this policy, and the change in the character of Taiwan policy shifting to an emphasis on the economy was implemented in a series of processes that culminated in these demands. In this manner, under the new Taiwan policy and the increasingly dire circumstances of the Cold War struggle over systems and ideology, Taiwan appealed to international society using its economic growth as a showcase, fulfilling the same function as West Berlin, an isolated island on the European continent, as an island in the Far East.