<研究論文(原著論文)>健康の必要十分条件を与える試み : アリストテレス的全体論の提案

Abstract

In my paper, I examine previous attempts to provide a necessary and sufficient condition of health and propose and defend what I call the Aristotelian holistic theory of health. In Section 2, I discuss Germund Hesslow's view that defining such a condition is of no significance and argue against his view by emphasising the theoretical and practical significance of clearly defining health. In Section 3, I examine Christopher Boorse's functional account on health, according to which health is the absence of disease. I argue that the functional account does not fit the world disease classification and makes the intergenerational comparison questionable. I also argue that it contradicts both preventive medicine and psychiatry and concedes a part of Hesslow's view. Furthermore, I argue that Boorse's critique of positive health complicates our attempt at defining health. In Section 4, I examine Lennart Nordenfelt's holistic theory of health, which is intuitive because it includes 'second-order ability' and 'standard circumstances'. I argue that the holistic theory does not solve the difficulty proposed by Boorse. In Section 5, I also examine the Aristotelian accounts provided by Christopher Megone and Philippa Foot. I argue that it is not clear that the Aristotelian accounts do not capture our intuition on health, although they do circumvent the difficulty proposed by Boorse. In Section 6, I propose and defend the compromise, the Aristotelian holistic theory of health. In addition, I explore what this view implies.