現象主義の検討

Abstract

I will discuss, in this paper, the phenomenalistic analysis of our sense-experience carried out by A.J.Ayer in "The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge". Ayer proposes that we should regard the objects of our perception not as material things (public objects) but as sense-data (private objects). And he says the sense-datum language provides us with the best terminology to analyse the relationship of our sense-experiences to the propositions we put forward concerning material things. In "Sense and Sensibilia", J.L.Austin critisizes what is told by Ayer and says the ordinary language can far better describe our experiences. But his criticism is not enough to reject Ayer's proposal. I show that the private object of our sense-experience can be introduced only when we have already referred to the public object, and that it is logically impossible in any language to designate a purely private object. Then, we can safely say that the phenomenalism is of no use in analysing our sense-experiences and that 'the foundations of empirical knowledge' are not in the privacy of our sense-data but in the publicity of the material world.