ヒュームの信念の理念について

Abstract

Hume thinks the exemplar of human knowledge is not absolutely certain 'knowledge' but our ordinary beliefs which are fallible. The chief objective of this paper is to investigate what this shift of emphasis means in his theory of knowledge, and try to understand his theory of belief in connection with his philosophical scheme, that is, 'the Science of Man'. As a preliminary, the author shows there are two criterions for the use of the word 'know', and each of them is closely connected with a theory of knowledge. The author then examines the theory of belief in A Treatise of Human Nature. Hume's explanation on this subject is divided into three parts; the nature of belief, its cause and its influence. According to his theory, the nature of belief is something that makes belief similar to impression, which he calls 'force and vivacity' or 'feeling'. And this vivacity comes from the impression related to the belief, and makes it the governing principle of our conduct. Therefore Hume defines belief as 'a lively idea related to or associated with a present impression.' But the definition seems to have something strange in it, because it consists of the nature and cause of belief, but Hume explains belief mainly by mentioning its effects. The author interprets this seeming-strangeness in the definition as the result of Hume's intention to demarcate beliefs for the purpose of constructing 'the Science of Man'. His theory of belief is built to include some normative element which is necessary for the science. Finally, Hume's theory of belief seems to play two important roles : as an explication of human nature and as a basis of the logic of inquiry. It is human nature that makes it possible. But Nature determines only the general framework of our knowledge. Philosophy can and should refine our common sense. Hume's 'Science of Man' is best understood as a program of inquiry along this line.