行為としての認識について

Abstract

In this paper, we criticize the traditional view of knowledge (representational view of knowledge), which takes knowing as the possession of a representation of the known thing. We argue that this view, which separates the knower from the known, can be an "explanation" of belief, which is what we assume about facts, but not that of knowledge, which brings about facts. As an alternative, we argue that knowing should be considered as an activity(energeia) in the genuine Aristotelian sense. Energeia is an actualization of a completed ability which the agent has acquired through the process of training or development. Therefore, according to our view, we have to have completed the particular ability of knowing beforehand and to be in a certain condition under which this ability is spontaneously actualized in order to know a paticular thing. If that condition is met when we encounter the thing to be known, we come to know the thing without being aware of how we come to participate in the activity of knowing. In this case, we have no significant "story" about how we know the known thing. We call this type of knowledge atheoretical knowledge. On the other hand, if this condition is fulfilled as the result of our conscious efforts, we have a certain "story" about how we come to know the known thing. We call this type of knowledge theoretical knowledge. Their essential difference consists not in the nature of knowledge, but in the process through which we come to participate in the activity of knowing.