道徳的葛藤と道徳判断の普遍化可能性―ウィンチの「道徳判断の普遍化可能性」に関する一考察―

Abstract

Some Kantian moral philosophers claim that all moral judgements are universalizable, but other philosophers argue that judgements made by agents facing 'moral conflicts' are not always universalizable. When an agent faces a moral conflict, he can regard two conflicting acts as right at the same time.This fact seems to be incompatible with the universalizability of moral judgements. In this paper I comment on an essay of Peter Winch, "The Universalizability of Moral Judgements" to explore this problem. In this essay Winch throws doubt on logical force of Sidgwick's 'universalizability thesis.' Winch says if he were in the situation of Captain Vere, a character in Melville's novel, he would make different choice from Vere's. But he also says both his hypothetical act and Vere's act are right. In this way, he maintains that his hypothetical judgement is not universalizable. But Winch's hypothetical judgement cannot be a counter-example against 'the universalizability thesis'. Because the thesis has a condition for application, "if there is no difference between the two persons in some important respects", and Winch's judgement does not satisfy this condition. According to Sidgwick, 'the difference in some important respects' means "the difference which we can regard as a reasonable ground for difference in their duties." Winch says the right action for him is different from the right action for Vere, that is, his duty is different from Vere's duty. And this means he thinks there is 'a difference which we can regard as a reasonable ground for difference in their duties'. Therefore his judgement does not satisfy the condition, and I conclude, his example cannot be a proper counter-example to the universalizability thesis.