ウィトゲンシュタインにおける基準概念の形成過程―「文法と事実の区別」に寄せて―

Abstract

In this paper, the author tries to bring the process of Wittgenstein's forming criteria concept to light, by the investigation of the development of verificationism, to which the picture theory of language came, in the Middle Wittgenstein. Thereby, first, the new overview concerning the characteristics of this concept opens. Wittgenstein's principle of verification that the meaning of a proposition is its method of verification led to the distinction between propositions and hypotheses. Further, the difference in what verifies a proposition and is immediately given led to the distinction between phenomena and symptoms. Phenomena have a grammatical relation to propositions and the former verify the latter. And symptoms, as evidences, prove hypotheses empirically and inductively. Afterwards, the distinction between phenomena and symptoms changed to that between criteria and symptoms by the analysis of intentionality. This change is one from immediate experiences to verbal expressions. As a consequence of the establishment of the autonomy of language, the idea of family resemblance is introduced. Thus, a situation appropriate for a family resemblance concept is regulated by criteria. They cannot be said, but are known implicitly. Second, the distinction between grammar and fact, that is, the premise of Wittgenstein's thought, which is not necessarily clear, is brought out in fuller relief. The distinction between factual and grammatical investigations is made methodically. The distinction between grammar and fact is situation-dependent and relative.