論理的真理に関するクワインの議論の検討

Abstract

Quine's epistemological theses on logical truth offer the key to an understanding of his other philosophical claims. The purpose of this paper is to study his discussions on logical truth in detail, and to consider the consistency of his claims. The revisability of logical truth seems to be followed from his epistemological holism. But on the other hand, the obviousness of logical truth was asserted in his some texts. To examine the compatibility of these two assertions, his arguments on logical truth in Word and Object, Philosophy of Logic are studied in this paper in the first place. We arrive at the conclusion that these two assertions are ultimately incompatible, and that the important point to note is the contrast between transcendence and immanence which he mentioned in regard to the matter of deviant logics. Finally, we survey arguments of The Roots of Reference and "Immanence and Validity", and seek some possible ways out of the difficulties.