<サーヴェイ論文>認識論と倫理学の交差点としての「帰納のリスク」

Abstract

So called "inductive risk" is an old but newly explored concept in philosophy of science. The central claim of the argument from inductive risk (AIR) is that scientists must make value judgments in their scientific reasoning, so that epistemology, ethics, and science and technology studies intersect in this theme. In this paper I give an overview of the controversy over inductive risk. Although the AIR has been criticized by proponents of value-free ideal of science, recent defenders of the AIR elaborate how and why scientific reasoning must involve value judgments. Furthermore, they have found that extended interpretations of inductive risk serve to grasp many value-laden choices involved in scientific reasoning, exploring many case studies in various disciplines. The defenders of the AIR are not monolithic, however. There remain some disagreements about the precise nature of the concept of inductive risk. This fact may induce some skeptical attitude toward the significance of the concept of inductive risk and the AIR. The last part of this paper is devoted to evaluating what advantages the concept of inductive risk and the AIR have relative to existing literature on science and values.