<研究論文(原著論文)>適切な存在論的コミットメントの基準はどのような制約を満たすべきか

Abstract

One of the central issues in contemporary metametaphysics is which criterion of onto- logical commitment should be adopted. However, in debates over criteria of ontological commitment, the following point is very rarely examined: for a criterion of ontological commitment to be adequate, what condition should generally be satisfied by said criterion? In this paper, I explore such a condition and propose a general constraint under which a criterion of ontological commitment is considered adequate. First, in Section 1, I will introduce a neutral scheme for criteria of ontological commitment. Next, in Section 2, I will show that various criteria of ontological commitment can be interpreted as instances of the scheme. Through those instances, it will be revealed that in this scheme, a component which can be described as "a definition of the range of reality/world (relative to the object language)" plays a key role. Then, in Section 3, I will note that there should be some condition which an adequate instance of this kind of definitions would satisfy. In addition, I will also clarify the explanatory requirement for such a condition. Finally, in Section 4, I will formulate a general constraint under which this kind of definition could be considered adequate and argue that this general constraint would meet the requirement specified in Section 3. This constraint is roughly based on the idea of restricted quantification (and reference) at metaphysical truth-conditions. Such a constraint can serve as a necessary condition, which should be satisfiable by an adequate criterion of ontological commitment.