<研究論文(原著論文)>唯名論者にとっての抽象性 : 時空領域の外側の物理世界

Abstract

These days, “scientific theory” deals with many theoretical entities. These entities include many things; universal entities to be instanced by many particulars such as electrons and balls, high-order physical abstract objects calculated mathematically not to correspond to observables such as Actions or Lagrangians. We can understand these entities in theoretical models and frameworks within which to theorize facts and phenomena by “idealization” and “abstraction”. Though Scientific realists commit theoretical entities, A question rises. Which kind of entity do they assert realism of? Universals in a model or particulars in an actual world? The former is realism and the latter is nominalism. In this paper, I consider whether particulars don’t have abstract features at all because a distinction between universals and particulars is often compared to that between abstractness and concreteness. While concrete physical objects interact with us through experiments and observations causally, abstract objects like mathematical numbers and sets are causally inert. So in fact, causality is a very important aspect to distinguish universals and particulars. But I want to show that the microphysical theory gives abstractness to particular quantum objects even if we choose a nominalistic approach and that some particulars oscillate in a physical abstract realm other than in spacetime. Therefore, I will introduce two new kinds of abstract features in microphysical particulars; one derived from only structural characters for material particles, the other from an abstract realm for virtual particles to oscillate in. These abstractnesses are what not universals in models but particulars in worldly systems possess.