このアイテムのアクセス数: 155
タイトル: | Optimal Timing of Environmental Policy under Asymmetric Information |
著者: | Shibata, Takashi |
著者名の別形: | 芝田, 隆志 |
キーワード: | environmental policy option value agency conflict asymmetric information |
発行日: | Aug-2005 |
出版者: | 京都大学大学院経済学研究科 |
引用: | Takashi Shibata. Optimal Timing of Environmental Policy under Asymmetric Information. 京都大学大学院経済学研究科Working Paper. 80, 2005.08. |
誌名: | 京都大学大学院経済学研究科Working Paper |
号: | 80 |
抄録: | This paper examines the optimal timing strategy of environmental policy in the presence of agency conflict due to asymmetric information. When the policy maker delegates the adoption of environmental policy to agents, contracts must be designed to provide incentive for agents to truthfully reveal private information. Using a contingent claims approach, this paper shows that an underlying option value of social welfare can be decomposed into two components: a policy maker’s option and an agent’s option. The value of social welfare in the asymmetric information setting is strictly lower than that in the full-information setting. In particular, the implied adoption strategy in the asymmetric information setting differs significantly from that in the full-information setting. |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2433/26701 |
出現コレクション: | Working Paper (外国語論文) |

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