實存哲學、ニーチェの哲學、西田哲學 (完) : 歷史的唯物論の意味の探究のために

Abstract

In order to obtain a better understanding of the meaning of historical materialism, the writer starts with the re-examination of the philosophy of existence, which, like historical materialism, is a product of our modern world, and is, accordingly, subject to a similar historical consciousness. The philosophy of existence is here understood in a broader sense, covering, besides Kierkegaard and Heidegger, not only Nietzsche's philosophy of life but also Nishida's philosophy, which is ultimately based on the buddhistic principle of ‘absolute nothingness' (Nirvāna). The philosophy of existence thus understood is observed to comprise in itself two phases : the historical and the super-historical. In its historical phase every philosophy of existence manifests its situational orientation in our modern world, mechanical and materialistic, and in this regard it is a ‘modern' philosophy, as Marxism is another, while in its super-historical phase the philosophy of existence, with all its orientation in the modern situation, transcends its historical settings and is more deeply rooted in the realm of : the original sin, the radical evil, freedom, contingency. And it may be added that it is in the latter of these two phases that the substance of the philosophy of existence is to be more manifestly perceived. But despite the nihilism of existence in despair with the world, which was necessitated by the above orientation in regard to both of the two phases, the main task of Nietzsche's philosophy was rather to overcome such a nihilism. Thus the significance of his “Superman”. But in so far as the Superman was entwined all through with the Eternal Recurrence, the overcoming was in Nietzsche neither real nor complete. The complete overcoming, according to the writer of the paper, is fundamentally realized in Nishida's philosophy which stands on the buddhistic theory of causality (“Engi” or pratītya-samutpāda). For the nihilism of the philosophy of existence presupposes the subject of freedom. Since, however, freedom cannot be secured in our modern world as it should be desirable, this comes to culminate in nihilism. Now in the philosophy of Nishida the subject of freedom is dead, and the nihilism there is itself negated; what remains dominant is a realm of sheer necessity. Such seems to be the basic outlook of Nishida's philosophy, remarkably buddhistic in its character. But if, on the contrary, the death of the subject of freedom assumes a positive shape within the modern historical consciousness, and is materialized in “matter”, then it is, concludes the writer, that we come upon the Marxist historical materialism.