發生的見地より見たる空間視知覺の問題 : 經驗効果の考察

Abstract

From the genetic point of view, the structure of perceptual space is observed to become more articulated as one's development advances stage by stage. A number of students of developmental pscychology have studied and described such developmental phases of articulation, but the problem, how these changes are brought about and what the principal factors in these changes are, remains untouched. Spontaneous maturational factors, and physiological as well as anatomical changes must surely play considerable parts, but we ought not to ignore the role of empirical effects either. As it is well known, the Gestalt theory of perception has rejected the importance of the effects of past experiences as a main factor in space perception, and emphasis has been laid on the forces of autonomous organization. Gottschaldt's experiments, so frequently quoted by Gestalt pscychologists, showed that simple repetitions of experience have no effect on the perception of a figure, and that how a figure is perceived at a moment is definitively determined by the inner organizing forces of the figure itself. But some questions remain to be raised. The figures used by Gottschaldt were of such a sort that the configurational factors therein were decidedly strong. Will not the effects of experience be more apparent if we use instead figures of weaker configurational factors? Djang's experiments (J. exp. Psychol. 1937) suggested some possibility towards such an end. We should think, in case the conditions of stimuli are so vague that the articulation is possible in several ways, then the effects of past experiences may work as the directing factor for the realization of a certain articulation at a certain moment. Moreover, Gottschaldt himself admitted the searching attitude as a situational factor in perception. Might not possibly the training in taking such an attitude or of how to perceive produce automatically a certain articulation in perception? Hanawalt's expriments (J. exp. Psychol. 1941) gave to this question an affirmative answer. We have thus to remark that the results of Gottschaldt's experiments were dependent upon the specific conditions of the experiments; 'empirical effects' should not be understood solely in terms of simple repetitions as is the case with his definition. In the field of perceptual constancy, the developmental increase of constancy has been a topic of discussions (Frank, Beyrl, Brunswik, Klimpfingel, Burzlaff, Koffka, Akishige). The general trend now seems to turn for the theory that there is no developmental increase. Misumi showed that the perceptual constancy of size could be recognized even in infants 8 months old (Bul. Fac. Lit. Kyushu Univ. 1951); Akishige showed that a high degree of constancy with regard to shapes existed in the first experience of a congenital blind girl who had acquired sight by means of atropin (IV. Mitteil. Jur.-Lit. Fak. Kyushu Univ. 1937). But the state of affairs does not seem to be so simple. Schlosberg admitted effects of experiences on the perceptual constancy (Psychol. Rev. 1950); Graham mentioned the conceptual development as a factor of perceptual constancy (Steven's Hab. of exp. Psychol. 1951); Kume's recent experiments show that the experimenters who are quite used to the situation and to experimental operations show a very high constancy in the perception of sizes even in dark room experiments (Jap. J. Psychol. 1952). Admitting that the perceptual constancy is a matter of spatial articulation, we should suppose that the articulation itself might vary according to the empirical as well as to the conceptual framework. Familiarity with the situation must have some influence on the articulation of space.

Krolik's experiments on the induced movement (Psychol. Forsch. 1934) showed that, which of the figures will be phaenomenally seen to move, depends upon the empirical natures of the stimuli figures. In the induced movement, the law of subordination and belonging is the most effective; but the empirical figures, in so far as they are seen realistically, are arranged in the visual field in accordance with empirical events, and this determines what is subordinate with reference to what. Thus, even phaenomenal events in perception are seen to be conditioned through experiences. Neither should we neglect the problem of identification with regard to perception. Perceptual behaviours are unique consistent responses to things or events in outer environments. It is not sufficient for the perceptual behaviours only to discriminate and to perceive the environment as such and such; one must identify the object, i.e. make a unique response to a discriminated object. Familiarity, the meaning, the conceptual framework and so on, have important effects on this phase of perception, as it is shown through many experimental evidences as well as through ancedotal records of the congenital blind who got eyesight by means of operations. In short, the rejection of the effects of experience on perception by the Gestalt psychology must be re-examined with the full equipment of experimental data. Experience seems to have some not unimportant effects even on the articulation of the perceived space. Gottschaldt, and the Gestalt psychologists, defined the effects of experience as well as the familiarity with objects only as the result of simple repetitions. Experience, however, is in itself an organization of the system of perceptions and actions. Behavioural space is to be ordered according to this organization. The phaenomenal space included in the behavioural space cannot be free from empirical organizations. To what extent and how this empirical organization determines the spatial articulation, should be regarded as an important problem, especially from the viewpoint of the genetic psychology.