中觀哲學の論理形態 (完)

Abstract

While the Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika school inquires after and looks to the absolute, the paramārtha, as translogical, the Yogācārins assume it as the immanent basis of the Universe. Bhāvaviveka, the founder of the Svātantrika Mādhyamika school, however, aims to clarify the contrast between the absolute (paramārtha) and the phenomenal world (saṁvṛti) by a special system of logic. He rejects the prasaṅga-anumāna (deductio ad absurdum), which is the unique method of the Prāsaṅgikas, who merely negate every syllogism. He tries thus to create “the logic of the paramārtha”, the principles of which completely differ from those of formal logic. For this purpose his syllogism is constructed out of several peculiar elements, which constitute the subdivisions of this paper, as follows : 1) The syllogism does not need “vipakṣe nāstitā” (the absence of reason in dissimilar instances, one of the three aspects of reason); this means at the same time the negation of all three aspects of reason. The vyāpti (universal concomitance) asserted by the Buddhist Logicians is based on identity and causality, which constitute the basis of human knowledge, which is in turn supported by the experiences of practical and successful action. Bhāvaviveka, on the contrary, condemns both these principles from the point of view of “the logic of the paramārtha”. 2) The conclusion or thesis of every syllogism must be the negative proposition, which is at the same time defined as simple and absolute negation (prasajya-pratiṣedha). Prasajyapratiṣedha means “A is not non-B” as well as “A is not B”, a negation of the law of the excluded middle. The ultimate reality, accordingly, is not defined by any conception. 3) The qualification “from the transcendental standpoint (paramārthatas)” is always placed at the head of the syllogism, in order to show that the syllogism demonstrates not the experiential world, but ultimate reality or paramārtha, the object of avikalpajñāna. At the same time this transcendental position lays the groundwork for his logic, which looks very illogical at first sight. The writer, comparing Bhāvaviveka's assertions about these problems with the opinions of Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, Uddyotakara, Śāntarakṣita, etc., (not to mention Candrakīrti), and criticising the Buddhist and Naiyāyika systems of logic, endeavors to clarify the logic of Bhāvaviveka, i. e. the Mādhyamika logic.