普遍、槪念、意味 (完)

Abstract

1. What is meant by the word 'meaning'? The quest for meaning is one salient key-note of 20th century's philosophy. Putting aside methodological or technical aspects, certainly the most controversial to-day, of the problem, we would rather shed light on the problem from the angle of 'universals-problem'. 2. Descriptions (in Mr. Russell's terminology) are marked out as the proper domicile of universals, with brief remarks on the relationist aversion to the subject-predicate form of propositions. 3. Realist, conceptualist and nominalist answers to the Porphyry's question are sketched to the effect that the last one (literally taken) having hardly existed, the so-called nominalists' defiance against unduly neglecting language should be appreciated. 4. Then, we examine the most prevalent conception of concepts which takes them for a kind ot representation i.e. determinate forms set before mental eyes, immanent within our mind. Abaelard's conceptualism, Thomist and Scotist realism, and Cartesian modern idealism all share this way of seeing concepts. Critical analysis of 'esse objeetiee in intelleetu' suggests us that concepts as such may be, as Ockham scented, something other than definite, static entities. 5. Hobbes' and Berkeley's casting off abstract general ideas on the basis of imagism is shown to raise up two problems anew : (1) about the nature of resemblance and (2) about functionate or operative aspects of general ideas. 6. The Resemblance theory and the Identity theory brought face to face, some advantages of the former are ascertained. 7. But our examination of Hume shows that the apprehensibility of resemblances presupposed even by the Habit theory comes out as a serious difficulty which any empiricist framework can never solve. Two possible ways of avoiding this difficulty are hinted : (1) the Kantian transcendentalist assertion that functionate concepts themselves establish all affinities among objects, and (2) the Phenomenologist and Whiteheadian rehabilitation of realism where universals are made to be intuited (prehended) by some eidetic sight (by abrupt realization). 8. A further notice added on functionate concepts in respect of a delicate, care-laden confusion of' named' and 'meant' which categorematic terms are liable to, while proper names as well as syncategorematic words are safe from. we conclude that concepts as such are functions in so many ways as they are objectified in two directions, real and symbolic. There is some good reason to retain three words 'universals', 'concepts' and 'meaning' in so far as we can say universals are meanings embedded in concrete reality, meaning universals woven in linguistic elements.