カント敎育學の解釋とその問題

Abstract

According to the former interpretations of Kant's pedagogics, its thought has been considered not as part of his own original philosophy, but as belonging to his pre-critical period, and formed to a great extent under the influence of Rousseau. The main reason for such an appraisal of Kant's pedagogics may be found in the following fact. While the end of Kant's pedagogics is the perfection of human natures, his own moral philosophy refuses to make it a motive of moral conduct. For if concrete human natures as such were to be made motives of conduct, there would be no universality of the maxims of moral conduct. In consequence, Kant's pedagogics has been considered to be a sort of eudaemonism, quite contrary to the peculiar thought of Kant's moral philosophy. However, we have to argue that to make the perfection of human natures the aim of pedagogics does not necessarily mean to make it a motive of moral conduct. On the contrary, the perfect human nature, which is once rejected as a motive of moral conduct, may well be the regulative end of moral teleology. Kant's moral philosophy does not neglect the existence of actual human natures; only he regards them as teleological ideas of itself. Accordingly, Kant's pedagogics and moral philosophy do not contradict with each other, but basically have the same objective. Kant's pedagogics must be discussed on the basis of the true understandidg of his moral philosophy.