西洋哲學と印度思想 (完) : 一つの比較的研究

Abstract

By 'western standpoint' the author means the attitude toward Indian thought that would be taken by the philosophers of modern analytical thought as is prevalent today in all Anglo-Saxon countries, and frequent in continental countries of Europe. This article consists of three lectures; in the first two lectures he tries to show what a western thinker would have to find fault with in Indian philosophy, and in the last, what he would have to learn and admire, were he actively engaged in such exotic pursuit. 1) The western philosopher's criticism is directed chiefly against the usage of the word 'philosohy' for Indian speculation; he would admit terms like theology, mysticism, and metaphysics--especially if he holds with so many modern thinkers that metaphysics is not philosophy in the academical sense any longer. The author further turns against the common Indian contention that India's spiritualism stands over against western materiarism; further, he feels that the basic difference in the respective approaches to philosophic problems is that the West has been or is, predominantly critical, whereas India is predominantly enthusiastic. 2) A semantic and linguistic analysis of the most frequent terms and concepts used in Indian thought is really the need of the day, particularly as it has not been attempted at all for Indian thought, least of all by an Indian scholar. The basic error--the error from which Plato and Aristotle suffered exactly as much as the Indian seers--was the notion that grammatical rules are logical, and that logical truth follows from correct grammar. This is wrong, for language is a natural thing, not a logical one. From this viewpoint, the author analyses each of the chief doctrines of the śruti (māhāvakya), and points out the mistake of non-distinction by the Indian pundits between the copulative and existential meaning of the Sanskrit verb 'to be' (asti, bhavati) and the double meaning of the word 'to know' (jnā, vid). Further he criticises the totally theological and teleological characteristic of Indian ethics which cannot be called a discipline of modorn philosophy, and finally gives remarks as for lack of esthetic gift in the modern Hindu thinkers who seem to have forgotten their own brilliant tradition of ancient Indian arts. 3) The Indians, however, have really proved of unmatched endurance with regard to 'paramparā' (tradition), one of the most marvellous cultural concepts anywhere. There are potentially at least, tremendous advantages in a well-founded tradition which every new thinker has but to add to. He can specialize on some minute branch indicated by the tradition, because he does not have to write the whole philosophy afresh every time. The author is interested in the notion of 'adhikara-bheda' (right to do something, or entitlement through capacity), which is most evident in the life of spiritual praxis, as meditation and worship; it assigns adequate methods to differently constituted individuals, a thing western scholasticism and western mysticism alike have never systematically propounded. The job of the individual aspirant is to find out at first, into which of a definte number of meditation-patterns he can fit--and the preceptor, being an experienced psychologist, initiates the disciple into the meditation which alone fits him. Besides these two, the author enumerates and comments on another several concepts like 'padārtha' (an item necessary for the realization of the aim set for any particular spiritual practice), 'freedom from dogmatism, ' 'esthetic theory of rasa', 'yoga', 'samanavaya' (reconciliation of diverging philosophical views) and so on. He attempts to show what is unique in Indian thought and in the action-pattern which derives from it. That is Unique, and entirely worthy of emulation by the philosophical West.