存在論的證明 : まだ論破されていない四つの形式

Abstract

After thirty-five years of study, the author has come to the conclusion that even the Anselmian form of the Ontological Argument has been misunderstood, rather than refuted, by Kant and other critics, and that much stronger forms of ontological proof are possible. The argument is not a simple step from concept to existence, but from concept to non-contingency ("Anselm's Principle"), and thus to the alternative: "perfection" is either impossible (not a significant and consistent idea) or necessarily existent. Hence to admit the logical possibility of the idea of perfection is by implication to admit the necessary existence of a perfect being. The proof is thus in terms of modal logic. It does not assume that existence is a predicate, but that modality with respect to existence is a predicate; however, whereas from contingency, existence does not follow, from necessity it does follow. "Anselm's Principle", that perfection cannot exist, or fail to exist, contingently, non-necessarily, is provable in many ways, of which four are given. A) To exist contingently is, ultimately, to exist by chance and precariously, which implies limitations to the existing thing's excellence. B) To exist contingently is to exclude positive existential alternatives ; perfection by its existence could not prevent anything else from existing. C) Contingently existing things have causes, and begin or come to be in time, which implies dependence and imperfection. D) Contingently existing things could conceivably be known to exist, and could also be known not to exist, both by imperfect minds, and also by a perfect mind; but the non-existence of perfection must be strictly unknowable, whether by a perfect mind (tautologically impossible) or by an imperfect one (also, in a less obvious way, tautologically impossible). The author is convinced that the only reasonable criticism of the argument is the simple positivistic one: We may not have an idea of perfection that has a consistent meaning. But the force of this positivist objection depends upon how perfection is conceived. Anselm's conception, the common one for nearly two thousand years, cannot it is conceded, be successfully defended against positivism; but an alternative conception has been developed in modern times, especially recently, which has not been shown to imply any contradiction, and which there is reason to regard as having meaning. However, it is necessary, and the new idea of perfection makes this possible, to insist upon a real distinction between existence and actuality, the former being that an individual exists in some concrete actual form or forms, the latter how, in what particular concrete states or experiences, it exists. Actuality is always empirical, but in the one case, that of perfection, existence need not and cannot be empirical. And yet it has not been shown meaningless or contradictory. Hence the proof stands, not as wholly conclusive, but as one of the most cogent and acute of all philosophical arguments.