存在と知識 : 仏教哲学諸派の論争 (第五百號記念特集號)

Abstract

The author tries to explain different philosophical attitudes of the four Buddhist schools from the standpoint of epistemology. Indian historians classify epistemology into two radically opposing theories, though not without subdivisions: nirākārajnānavāda-the theory that knowledge cognizes only the form of an external object, and sākārajnānavāda-the theory that knowledge cognizes only its own representation. The Sarvāstivādin as a realist insisted on the former view. Starting from this basic distinction, the author elucidates the way of thinking of the Sarvāstivāda ; main topics discussed in the present article are as follows: 1) The theory of category is common to the Sarvāstivādin, Vaiśesika, and Naiyāyika. 2) This theory of category is always combined with a particular kind of realism; and it is made possible by the belief that each of rational human ideas and words-which are systematically subsumed under the categories-necessarily has its own object which is an external reality. 3) This kind of realism results from their theory that a cognition cannot cognize itself (the negation of svasamvedana, or the self-cognition of knowledge) and that, therefore, if we cognize a form, the latter must exist as a separate reality outside the cognition. Knowledge has no form of its own, i. e. it has no function of representation, and always grasps the form of an object which is external to it. This theory, nirākārajñānavāda, forms the basic principle of Indian realism represented by the Sarvāstivādin, Vaiśesika as well as Naiyāyika. 4) The Sarvāstivādin insisted that the subject of visual perception is not knowledge, but the visual organ. This view is proved to be a necessary corollary of their negation of the self-cognition of knowledge and their theory of category as a kind of realism. 5) The Sarvāstivādin's ideas of sabhāga and tatsabhāga and their theory that the essence of every thing is existent throughout past, present, and future times can be explained from their theory of nirākārajñāna. They maintain that one cannot cognize-i. e. remember or imagine-a past or future object, unless the object is in essence existent at present. This view is derived from the theory that every object of knowledge must be existent outside knowledge, and this is the same as nirākārajñānavāda.