自由・運命・摂理

Abstract

Freedom is the essential condition of moral action and, as such, it includes responsibility as its inseparable element. Freedom is the right we have to think and act according to our own judgment and decision, whereas responsibility, is the obligation to use this right rightfully, that is, in conformity with law, which functions as a regulator of our community life. Aristoteles distinguishes between voluntary (εκουσιον), and involuntary (ακουσιον), and according to him, all actions which are morally and legally praised and blamed must be voluntary. He defines voluntary action as an act of which the origin lies in the agent, who knows the particular circumstances in which he is acting, whereas an involuntary act is defined as an act done under compulsion or through ignorance. But, in spite of this distinction, he admits the existence of some actions of a mixed character, namely, actions which are partly voluntary, partly involuntary. This is a very important point in his analysis of the voluntary, because it shows that human actions are neither absolutely free nor absolutely, determined, but products of the interaction between free will and determination. The word destiny (μοτρα) in Greek tragedy is believed to mean a fearful force which determines human life externally regardless of human will. However, it has nothing to do with fatalism, rather it leaves room for some correlations between human will and destiny. This applies to a certain degree to the Stoic theory of fate, too, though its attempts to synthesize freedom with fate remain quite incomplete. In the solution of this problem, Christian theology has made great progress, by developing a metaphysical theory of freedom in relation to its fundamental concept of providence.