科学的認識をめぐる合理論と経験論の対立と交錯 : その現代理論哲学における意味

Abstract

In this essay I try to re-examine the classical opposition of empiricism to rationalism in epistemology in view of contemporary theoretical philosophy The focus of the consideration is in the question whether the logical character of universal laws, theories and theoretical terms as essential constituents in science can be satisfactorily explained from the empiricist point of view. But the verification theory of meaning, inductivism, rigid nominalism and reductionism are unwarranted. Empirical interpretation of theoretical terms is possible only partially. Further, the methodological decision is inevitable for the rational inquiry of the world. Therefore, radical empiricism collapses. Taking notice of this inductive risk and Kant's idea of Hineinlegen, it is more probable to adopt Popper's hypothetico-deductive method or Hempel's modification of it, although it is not yet conclusive whether the theory of corroboration or confirmation could offer a satisfactory criterion of demarcation. In conclusion, the uncritical or comprehensive rationalism including both radical empiricism and extreme rationalism would be rejected, and the logical status of scientific knowledge could be more satisfactorily explained from the view point of critical rationalism.