バートランド・ラッセルの記述理論形成の過程 : 意味論・存在論の見地から

Abstract

1. There are two semantical principles in The Principles of Mathematics (1903): (1) Every word occurring in a sentence indicates a certain entity, and must have a psychological meaning (indication). (2) A denoting concept denotes a thing or a combination of things and thus has a logical meaning (denotation). 2. But Russell discovered a difficulty in the above-mentioned semantical principles. He argued in "On Denoting" (1905) that we could not succeed in both preserving the connection of meaning (denoting concept) with denotation and in preventing them from being one and the same. This argument shows Russell's turning point in semantics. 3. 1905's Theory of Description shows that a denoting phrase is essentially part of a sentence, and does not, like most single words, indicate anyting. Thus the two semantical principles are modified as follows: (1) Every single word in a sentence has a meaning as indication, but a denoting phrase or description has no such meaning (denoting concept) on its own account. (2) It is merely in the case of its proper use that a definite description denotes a unique object which is the denotation of the description. These tow principles are, I think, all that directly follows in semantics from the Theory of Description. (3) Further, Russell proposes an epistemological principle in the analysis of propositions, namely, that every proposition that we can understand is composed wholly of real entities with which we have immediate acquaintance. I think, however, this principle of reducibility to acquaintance is logically independent from the Theory of Description, although it may be taken as one of its possible interpretations. 4. Russell rejected his own populous ontology in The Principles of Mathematics, because in such an ontology, there is a failure of a robust sense for reality. This change in his ontology began with his criticism of Meinong's theory. 5. The Theory of Description made necessary the following changes in his ontology: (1) By Occam's razor, an abstract entity such as meaning (denoting concept) is deleted from his ontology of 1903. (2) An improper description has no denotation. Further, Russell introduced a distinction between particulars and universals based mainly on an epistemological ground other than that of the distinction between things and concepts. But whether things should be restricted to the objects of acquaintance is questionable.