探究と倫理 : パースにおけるプラグマティズムと規範学の理論

Abstract

The aim of this article is to identify and to clarify the connection between Peirce's pragmatism and his theory of normative sciences. For this purpose, the author examines: 1) Peirce's awareness of the difficulty inherent to his own early pragmatist theory of inquiry and of the need of its reconstruction from the perspective of the theory of normative sciences. 2) The detail of his early pragmatist theory of inquiry and its shortcomings. 3) His theory of normative sciences and the suggested answer to the difficulty of the logic of inquiry from this theory. With these considerations, the author concludes: 1) Peirce's treatment of inquiry and ethics is still unsatisfactory because it leaves untouched the problem of technology as an incentive of hu-man inquiry. 2) Peirce's strongest point lies in his insistence upon the importance of creative aspect of inquiry, that is, our conjecture and hypothesis making. Indeed, this creative aspect of inquiry saves the trivialization and automatization of inquiry, which are the roots of the demoralization of science.