ヒュームにおける理性と情念

Abstract

In this paper we have tried to throw some light on the relation between reason and passion in Hume's moral theory. The argument falls into two parts. In the first section we scrutinize the distinction between reason and passion, and then the role of reason in Hume's thoughts of morals. He emphasizes that the principle which opposes our passion cannot be reason so that there can be no combat of passion and reason. Eliminating reason as an opponent of passion, he asserts that only passions move us to act, while reason alone can never be a motive to any action. But Hume does not deny the practical function of reason. On the contrary, he admits that reason, especially in the form of causal reasoning, influences the will to direct a passion to its proper object, or to means for acquiring such an object. Thus, the famous passage in the Treatise, "reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions", is a misleading expression. Now, it is doubtful whether the distinction between reason and passion is capable to be drawn so clearly, when we consider the following points. (1) The belief, an important element of causal reasoning, is "more properly an act of the sensitive than of the cogitative part of our natures". (2) There are, Hume says, calm, but often strong passions in us, the operation of which feels so much like that of reason that they are confused with reason and in most cases "improperly" called reason. In the second section we deal with Hume's thoughts of the moral judgement, mainly in his analysis of justice, which is the most important of artificial virtues. According to Hume's explanation, the moral distinction, vice and virtue, is based on certain sentiments of pain and pleasure given through the operation of sympathy, since vice and virtue are not matters of fact whose existence can be inferred by reason. But sympathy is often biased, because we take a more lively interest in persons who are close to us than in those far removed in space or time. There is, in fact, no suggestion (in the Treatise, at least) that we have an impartial feeling to mankind. And yet Hume recognizes that a common and disinterested standpoint must be adopted for purpose of accurate moral evaluation. He seems to regard a calm passion, mentioned in the first paragraph, as the basis for such a standpoint. For he says that the disinterested standpoint is achieved through "that reason, which is able to oppose our passion, and which we have found to be nothing but a general calm determination of the passions founded on some distant view or reflection". Some question, however, arises out of this explanation, on account of the following points. (1) A calm passion can sometimes become a violent one. (2) Reason is apt to be confused with "improper" reason. On the whole, it seems that Hume's solution of the problems discussed in this paper is far from clear.