対話と想起 : プラトン哲学の「方法」(その一)

Abstract

It goes without much saying that Plato's works are written in a unique style, that is, the style of philosophical dramas. He has never changed this dialogue-form up to his last writings, the writings in which substantial arguments are expressed through the mouth of the main speaker so exclusively that they would be rather more naturally conveyed in the conventional style oftreatise. Nevertheless, Plato seemed to feel the necessity to adopt this style even for the Laws. This fact suggests that he had some indispensable reason to adopt it, the reason which could not be explained away on mere rhetorical grounds. If this were the case, it is clear that his thought will not be adequately grasped without fully taking notice of the uniqueness and significance of his characteristic dialogue-form. In this paper, the author will try to rethink the form itself so as to bring its uniqueness into relief and clarify the reason why Plato sticked to the idea of writing in such a style. The uniqueness of Plato's writings does not consist merely in its dialogical style, but rather in the fact that Plato himself never appears on the stage throughout all his dialogues. Indeed, he refers to himself only twice in his such a voluminous works (excluding the letters), and, in one of the two cases, he mentions his name only to inform us about his absence from the conversation carried on in the Phaedo. He deliberately sets up his own alibi in this case. All other conversations in other dialogues are also carried out where he is absent. Of course, personae dramatis (including Socrates) are not mere mouthpieces of his thoughts. We should assume that Plato, as the author, intentionally distantiates himself from the statements expresssed in the conversations. In order to make sense of this ‘absence of the author', some modern scholars such as Ph. Merlan offered a scepticism interpretation. On the other hand, L. Edelstein identifies a positive meaning in this feature by naming it the ‘Platonic anonymity'. He emphasizes the ‘objective' factor of dialogue-form, that is, ‘peculiarly Platonic argument for renouncing one's claims to originality'. It is Edelstein's understanding that Plato adopted this style of anonymity because he thinks that ‘truth is something outside of him. It is not made or invented'. The present author agrees to his argument up to this point. However, we must also recognize the ‘subjective/existential' factor of the dialogue-form. Edelstein himself does not wish to neglect this factor; he is ‘far from minimizing the importance'. But he does not seem to fully appreciate the significance of this factor, though he is right in his refusal of the scepticism interpretation on it. We should understand it more fully, and in a different way from that of the scepticism interpreters. The present author argues that these ‘subjective' and ‘objective' factors are, so to speak, the two sides of one crucial point from which the dialectical inquiries are called for. Platonic dialogues secure themselves the ‘objective' status with their ‘absence of the author', while they retain subjective character by means of their ad hominem structure of arguments which are carried out among specifically identified persons. Plato keeps these two factors bound together in his all writings in order to reject any kind of ready-made authority of wisdom. Or rather, he was forced to recognize that, even if there were indeed a certain wisdom/knowledge, it is not something to be acquired from other wise men, nor something to be conveyed by its ready-made teachings, and that the only way to get it is to search through really embraced belief (doxa) in one's own mind.

Dialogue in the Platonic meaning is the way to search for truth through the process of mutually exchanging and examining the opinions among the speakers step by step. It is a crucial condition for each conversation to get a satisfactory result that its participants should be all faithful to themselves; they must always say ‘what they think', as Socrates requires in the Protagoras. If only they are always aware of this requirement, it is the matter of no much concern whether or not they make some unintended mistake in their course of expressing own opinions. Mistakes will be checked anyhow in due course of conversations. When a certain agreement is reached through such dialogical process, the result will be shared as a common and approved thing by all the speakers, and will be no longer a sheer subjective belief. It can be said that the Platonic dialogue is a truly effective way to realize such a process. Plato, the author, joins in his dialogues as a listener so that he will come to see himself objectified in his own works. We readers can join, too, so far as we can agree with the steps of the conversation written by Plato. It depends on the writer's skill how far we can go along with these steps convincedly, while we readers have our own responsibility to join in Platonic dialogues substantially.