ヘーゲル、もう一つの感性論 (Asthetik) : 「物」というフィクション

Abstract

As I have already suggested in "The Journal of Philosophical Studies" (Nr. 564), we can find another 'aesthetics as a new science' among the various works of Hegel, which clarifies the structures of human experiences and the functions of sensibility and feeling. Actually, Hegel's so-called "Aesthetics", which he himself originally had preferred to call "The Philosophy of Art", has its roots deep in this 'another aesthetics' In this article, I would like to turn my attention to Hegel's radical theory of 'perception' in his work, "Phenomenology of Mind" (1807), in which he deconstructed every fixed belief in the truth of our consciousness and unveiled its relativity. According to Hegel's consequent thinking, criterion of the truth is always changed in, and related to, the formations of every consciousness each time it happens. With regards to the 'perception', its discourse of truth always depends on the belief in the real existence of 'things'. In other words, the truth of perception and the belief in the reality of things have always been correlating to each other. Therefore, the reality of things must be changed into fiction if we understand that the structure of perception is only in the unstable to-and-fro motion between contradictory statements, i. e. on one hand, 'the thing is one', but on the other hand, 'the thing has many qualities'. Hegel revealed the structure of this contradictory consciousness and its tacit belief in the reality of things (=strongly entrenched superstition in human mind). His radical theory of perception supports his fundamental understanding of art because he repeatedly insists that the existence of art has no direct relation to things as real beings, but to their 'appearances' ('Scheinen' or 'Erscheinen'), which are already emancipated from the real being. Furthermore, his theory of perception can play an important role in the theories of art and art history today. They are bounded by the cognitive psychology as before, which is not entirely free from the belief in the being of real things. It seems to me that this fixed belief may be a stumbling block to all sciences.