志向性 : 現在状況と歴史的背景 (二)

Abstract

In this second part, I examine Brentano's notion of intentional inexistence, with particular reference to Aristotle's psychology and Cartesian philosophy of mind. The primary focus of my research is centered on the following two issues : 1.Theoretical framework of the concept of intentional inexistence : (i) Brentano's concern in psychology is to find a feature which distinguishes mental phenomena from physical phenomena. It was in connection with this distinction that he developed his conception of the intentional inexistence as the decisive feature of mental phenomena. Such a distinction has its origin in Cartesian mental-physical dualism, although Brentano uses the term "phenomenon" in order to avoid the commitment to substance dualism. In Aristotle's theory of the soul (psyche-logy), on the other hand, there is no such dualistic distinction. The soul is a composite of different kinds of faculties, including a digestive and a locomotive faculty. Digestion is just as much a psychological activity as is intellectual thought, and even the sensitive and intellectual activities of soul do not have such a unity as the mental phenomena have. (ii) Brentano distinguishes three fundamental classes of mental phenomena : representation (Vorstellung), judgment (Urteil), and phenomenon of love or hate (Phänomen der Liebe oder des Hasses). Among these classes, representation constitutes the primary phenomenon. It provides the foundation for the phenomena of judgment and love or hate respectively. Therefore in unifying the mental phenomena for which the notion of the intentional inexistence is introduced as a positive criterion, representation plays a crucial role. In this threefold division and the primacy of representation, Brentano admits that Descartes preceded him; Descartes distinguishes ideae, judicia, and voluntates, giving the fundamental role to ideae. For Aristotle, however, there are no phenomena of the soul that have founding function for all mental activities. 2.The problem with Brentano's interpretation of Aristotle's psychology : The notion of intentional inexistence comes from Brentano's interpretation of the Aristotelian idea that sense-perception is the reception of τό αίσθητόν without its matter. Brentano, in his footnote to the so-called intentionality passage in his Psychologie, refers to this idea with the paraphrase : 'sense receives the sensed object (das Empfundene) without its matter'. However, τό αίσθητόν means (at least for Aristotle) the sensible object (as Brentano himself usually translates it 'das sensibles Objekt'), not the sensed object. It is clear that τό αίσθητόν as the sensible object should be external to the sensing subject. For it is possible for τό αίσθητόν in this sense to be there without being actually sensed by any sensing subject. Brentano's interpretation of τό αίσθητόν as the sensed object ignores this implication of that term and makes it possible to 'place' the object of senseperception in the sensing subject. Finally I add some remark on the tradition of Neoplatonic interpretation of Aristotle's theory of perception, which might provide a background for Brentano's immanentistic interpretation. From these considerations, I conclude that, in spite his conviction that the principal source for the notion of intentional inexistence is Aristotle's psychology, we can detect greater influence of Cartesian, internalist view in this notion.