アティシャの論理学に対する立場 (特集 : 「始源の思索」)

Abstract

Atiśa (Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna, 982-1054), an Indian monk of the late Madhyamaka school, influenced Tibetan Buddhism in the time of the later dissemination by propagating Indian Buddhism in Tibet for thirteen years and by translating many Indian works into the Tibetan language. Later in Tibetan doxography, he is often classified as a *Prāsaṅgika (Thal 'gyur ba) rather than a *Svātantrika (Raṅ rgyud pa), for whom autonomous inference (svatantrānumāna) is a method to prove the emptiness of all things. Ejima has pointed out, mainly on the basis of Atiśa's Satyadvayāvatāra, that Atiśa rejected the doctrines of the Buddhist logico-epistemological school. Nagashima has argued, based on Atiśa's understanding of paramārtha, that Atiśa can be regarded as a Prāsaṅgika. And on the basis of Atiśa's close connection with the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa, Nagashima has tried to explain such perplexing evidence as Atiśa's approval of the Svātantrika Bhāviveka while maintaining his own Prāsaṅgika view. Apparently, however, Atiśa, in the commentary on his main work, Bodhipathapradīpa, takes autonomous inference as one of the four great reasons (gtan tshigs chen po bźi), quoting the verses of Śāntarakṣita and Śrīgupta, who are classified as Svātantrika. This paper clarifies the relationship between the four great reasons and Atiśa's denial of inference. In the Satyadvayāvatāra, Atiśa denies the plurality of the absolute reality (paramārtha) and reject the possibility of attaining the absolute through such valid means of knowledge as direct perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna) since this could imply that non-Mādhyamikas could also attain the absolute. This might be counted as evidence that he is Prāsaṅgika, but he takes a contradictory stand in his description of the four great reasons. Atiśa mentions autonomous inference as one of the great reasons in the Bodhimārgadīpa-pañjikā and furthermore deals with masters of Svātantrika like Bhāviveka and Śāntarakṣita on the same basis as Candrakīrti there. Atiśa does not seems to be aware of the distinction between Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika, and he ignores Candrakīrti's objection against Bhāviveka. It should be noted that according to the Bodhimārgadīpa-pañjikā, the four great reasons are employed only until one obtains certainty (niścaya) before entering the practice of non-conceptuality and are not concerned directly with the absolute. Therefore, it is not inconsistent for Atiśa to accept autonomous inference until obtaining certainty, while denying that one can attain the absolute itself by inference. Atiśa's description of the four great reasons, in which he treats Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti regardless of their attitude to autonomous inference, shows his unawareness of the distinction between Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika. It is true, as is often pointed out, that Atiśa considers Candrakīrti as more important than Bhāviveka in the description of his lineage, the classification of Buddhist masters in the Ratnakaraṇḍodghāṭa, and so forth, but this is not because Atiśa is a Prāsaṅgika. Although the reason is still unclear, an answer may be found in the context of the reevaluation of Candrakīrti that took place in late Indian Buddhism.