パースの批判的常識主義

Abstract

Peirce presented his epistemological fallibilism as a criticism of Cartesian foundationalism. He rejected not only foundationalism but also naturalism. I will argue that his later claim "critical common-sensism" plays an important role to make his non-foundationalistic and non-naturalistic epistemological alternative possible. The most difficult drawback to his project is how it can overcome the infinite regress problem. His critical common-sensism suggests that our epistemological enterprise, as long as it is an inquiry which is carried out by a human being, always has limits. Those limits are essentially indubitable common-sense beliefs, and they are not subjects to reflective rational self-control. This means that his epistemological project takes account of such a limited human ability and can avoid the infinite regress problem by setting up those limits. We recognize that his epistemological alternative is established as a consistent consequence of his fallibilism which is his fundamental claim about human knowledge.