真矛盾主義的一元論 : 後期西谷哲学の再編成 (上)

Abstract

This paper aims to interpret Keiji Nishitani's philosophy expressed in his "Emptiness and That-Is-Ness" (1982) as dialetheic monism, as I call it, and to modify it by incorporating a version of paraconsistent logic in an attempt to solve the problems that he left unanswered. In the first part of this paper, it is argued that Nishitani's position is a sort of neutral monism, but that he had yet to provide a definition of neutrality that was capable of distinguishing his position from mentalism and the double aspect theory, and to give reasons why the neutral monistic worldview was more fundamental than the dualistic one. I then try to give natural formulations of the logical structures that Nishitani ascribed to each of two stages of his neutral world, i.e., the artistic and religious stages, as I call them. I do this using the notation of first order logic and set theory. I will make explicit the contradiction in the artistic stage that, I claim, he admitted implicitly.