真矛盾主義的一元論 : 後期西谷哲学の再編成 (下)

Abstract

This paper aims to interpret Keiji Nishitani's philosophy expressed in his "Emptiness and That-Is-Ness" (1982) as dialetheic monism, as I call it, and to modify it by incorporating a paraconsistent logic in an attempt to solve the problems that he left unanswered. In this second and last part of the paper, the following observations and claims are made. Nishitani acknowledged that there should be a logic which was to hold at one of the two stages of his monistic world, i.e., the artistic stage. He then suggested that it might be something like 'la logique des sentiments' of Theodore Ribot, a French psychologist. But it seems me that Ribot's logic is too psychologistic to be appropriate as a logic for the monistic world. So, in the place of it, I propose as a more promising candidate for the logic, a paraconsistent logic: neo-Nishitanian Logic or NNL, which prevents explosion to triviality from occurring. Only with the help of NNL, one can address the unanswered problems, I claim. But this modified version of Nishitani's position or neo-Nishitanian philosophy, as I call it, differs from its original in some import aspects. For Nishitani, scientific facts can be described only within the framework of classical logic, according to which no true contradiction is possible. But a neo-Nishitanian claims that they can also be formulated in terms of NNL, which allows as logically possible such true contradiction as 'something is mental, not mental, physical, and not physical'. Nishitani also thought that there was no logic holding at the other stage of his monistic world, i.e., the religious stage. According to him, the religious stage was more fundamental than the artistic one, and made the latter possible. In contrast, a neo-Nishitanian holds that the religious stage, too, has its own logic, i.e. NNL, and the stage is neither fundamental nor more superficial than the artistic stage.